

KNOW-HOW LAB
COGITO EPISTEMOLOGY RESEARCH CENTRE
@ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
KNOW-HOW Lab
Knowledge, Action and Competence: a new framework for theoretical and practical control across intelligence domains
2025–2030
Principal Investigator: J. Adam Carter
Team: Mariona Miyata-Sturm (Postdoctoral Fellow); Jesper Kallestrup (Senior Professorial Fellow, February–August 2026); Christoph Kelp (ERC Professorial Fellow in Knowledge and AI, 2025–26); Research Affiliates Emma C. Gordon, Mona Simion and Kurt Sylvan; Satsuki Inoue (Visiting PhD student, Chiba University); Sophia Pettigrove (Research Assistant)
Funding: European Research Council Advanced Grant 101199255 (EUR 2.48 million)
Project website: https://www.knowhow-research.com
Overview
Knowing what is true is valuable, but knowing how to do things matters just as much, and there is still no agreed account of what know-how is or how it is exercised. KNOW-HOW is a five-year ERC Advanced Grant project, based at COGITO, that develops a virtue-theoretic account of know-how as an achievement rather than a mere success: a competence that delivers creditworthy success in a performance domain, as opposed to success that is lucky or merely reliable. The framework is then used to give unified accounts of two things philosophers usually treat separately: intentional action, understood as creditworthy practical control, and judgmental knowledge, understood as creditworthy epistemic control.
Work packages
WP1 Know-how as an achievement virtue: what separates genuine know-how from a merely successful disposition, and how creditworthiness varies with the precision a task demands.
WP2 Intentional action as creditworthy control: intentional actions as control attempts that must meet a contextual standard of creditworthiness.
WP3 Judgmental knowledge and know-how: judgment as an epistemic control attempt, and settling a question as something one can know how to do well.
WP4 Default assumptions, risk and control: when agents may legitimately take features of their environment for granted in action and in judgment, using a de minimis model of risk.
WP5 Knowledge, action and artificial intelligence: principled criteria for distinguishing genuine achievement dispositions in AI systems from lucky success, and a control account for AI systems with representational and practical goals.
Events
The project runs an international conference each year and co-sponsors events with partner projects: AI Epistemics: Knowing in the Age of AI (Athens, 30 March–1 April 2026); Knowledge, Action, and Competence, with a book symposium on Ernest Sosa's The Bounds of Knowledge (Seville, 4–6 May 2026); Knowledge, Language, and Action, with a book symposium on Annalisa Coliva's Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology (Sitges, 9–11 August 2026); the BSTK 2026 Biennial Conference (Oxford, 2–4 September 2026); and, forthcoming, Testimony, Aesthetics and Know-How (Glasgow, 2027). The KNOW-HOW seminar series and weekly co-working sessions are listed on the Events page.
Outputs so far
Publications by the KNOW-HOW team that acknowledge the project’s ERC funding (grant 101199255), newest first.
Books
J. Adam Carter and Neil Levy, How We Govern Our Minds Through Others: Epistemic Autonomy Beyond the Myth of Independence (MIT Press, 2026, open access).
Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp, Knowledge and Conceptual Engineering: The Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics of Meaning Production (Oxford University Press, 2026, open access).
Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion, Knowledge and Artificial Intelligence: A Foundational Framework for the Epistemology of AI (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Elements, forthcoming).
J. Adam Carter and Timothy Kearl, Knowledge, Action, and Accident: An Epistemic Theory of Control (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, open access).
Journal articles
Simion, Kelp and Mace, “The Epistemology and Semantics of Ignorance”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2026).
Carter and Piedrahita, “Ignorance and Autonomous Belief”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2026).
Carter, “Who Acts When the Machine Decides? Intentional Action and Agentic AI”, Inquiry (2026).
Carter, “Autonomous Knowledge: Responses to My Critics”, Inquiry (2026).
Carter and Kallestrup, “Virtuous Deferral”, Noûs (2026).
Carter and Willard-Kyle, “Virtue Epistemology for the Zetetic Turn”, Mind 134(536) (2025).
Kearl and Carter, “Easy Practical Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy (2025).
Chapters and forthcoming articles
Simion and Willard-Kyle, “Trusting AI: Explainability versus Trustworthiness”, in Cappelen and Sterken (eds), Communicating with AI (Oxford University Press, 2026).
Simion, “On Exercising Epistemic Agency”, Criminal Law and Philosophy (forthcoming).
Carter, “A Virtue Theoretic Approach to Practical Knowledge”, in Vetter and Schoonen (eds), The Epistemology of Ability (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Carter, “Epistemic Polarization”, in Hales (ed.), Reason and Relevance (Hackett, forthcoming).
Working papers
Carter, “Good Moves” (draft, September 2026): telic know-how as a stable, trainable disposition to select and sequence good moves across the live contexts a task presents.
Full list, with abstracts: KNOW-HOW Publications
Talks
Talks by members of the KNOW-HOW team since the project began in October 2025.
Upcoming
7–8 November 2026: J. Adam Carter, Responsible Trusting Without Prejudice workshop, University of Stirling (title to be announced).
19 November 2026: Mariona Miyata-Sturm, “A Feeling for Knowledge”, Meta-Metcalfe meeting of the International Association for Metacognition, San Diego.
19 November 2026: J. Adam Carter, “Good Moves”, Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling.
21 November 2026: Mariona Miyata-Sturm, “Aesthetic Theoretical Virtues Will Not Help You Gain Nonfactive Understanding”, PSA 2026, Philosophy of Science Association, San Diego.
November 2026: Mariona Miyata-Sturm, invited talk, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (title to be announced).
January 2027: J. Adam Carter, comments on Elias Brockman, “Valuing Knowledge”, APA Eastern Division Meeting, Boston.
24–25 February 2027: J. Adam Carter, colloquium and research-group talk, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico City (titles to be announced).
16 March 2027: J. Adam Carter, workshop on human agency and generative AI, Centre for Data Futures, King’s College London (title to be announced).
Past talks: J. Adam Carter
22 September 2026: “An Anti-Luck Epistemology of Objectual Understanding” (with Emma C. Gordon), Bounded Knowledge: A Meeting with Ernest Sosa, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
4 September 2026: “Good Moves: A Framework for Telic Know-How”, invited talk, BSTK 2026 Biennial Conference, University of Oxford.
11 August 2026: “Manifesting Know-How”, Knowledge, Language, and Action, Sitges.
9 August 2026: commentary on Annalisa Coliva’s Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, book symposium, Sitges.
1 July 2026: “Know-How in Motion”, Knowledge in Crisis: Knowledge, Power and Social Life, University of Vienna.
28 May 2026: “Good Moves: A Risk-Theoretic Account of Telic Know-How”, Arché Epistemology Current Themes Seminar, University of St Andrews.
24 May 2026: “Lucky Understanding Revisited” (with Emma C. Gordon), What Counts as Scientific Understanding in Cognitive Science?, University of Bucharest (online).
16 May 2026: “Good Moves: A Risk-Theoretic Account of Telic Know-How”, keynote, Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason, Sofia University.
6 May 2026: “Blissfully Golfing: Bounded Aiming, Default Assumptions, and the Shape of Hip Inquiry” (with Jesús Navarro), Knowledge, Action, and Competence, University of Seville.
30 March 2026: “From Epistemic Growth to Epistemic Pollution”, AI Epistemics: Knowing in the Age of AI, Onassis Library, Athens.
19 February 2026: “The Epistemic AI Alignment Problem” (with Emma C. Gordon), Engineering the Concept of Hermeneutical Injustice, University of Seville.
10 December 2025: “Good Moves: A Risk-Theoretic Account of Telic Know-How”, research seminar, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
29 November 2025: “AI and the Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research” (with Emma C. Gordon), Neurons and Machines, University of Ioannina.
27 November 2025: “Agentic AI and Action: How to Perform a Non-Basic Action Through AI”, keynote, Neurons and Machines, University of Ioannina.
16 October 2025: “AI, Inquiry, and Scientific Progress” (with Emma C. Gordon), Inaugural Inquiry Lecture, Young Academy of Europe Annual Meeting, Barcelona.
Past talks: Jesper Kallestrup (Senior Professorial Fellowship, February–August 2026)
1 July 2026: “Epistemic AI: Instruments, Authorities or Experts”, Trust, Trustworthiness & AI workshop, University of Sheffield.
1 June 2026: “Epistemic Pollution”, Information Integrity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives workshop, Advanced Research Centre, University of Glasgow.
29 May 2026: “Epistemic Cults”, keynote, The Wisdom, and Madness, of Crowds workshop, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
30 March 2026: “From Epistemic Pollution to Epistemic Sustainability”, AI Epistemics: Knowing in the Age of AI, Onassis Library, Athens.
27 March 2026: “Credit and Blame for Generative AI Use” (with Matthew Jope), Workshop on the Ethics and Epistemology of (Generative) AI, University of Aberdeen.
19 March 2026: “Seeing through the Smog” (with J. Adam Carter), UKRI Future Internet Workshop, London.
Past talks: Christoph Kelp
3 September 2026: “Artificial Epistemic Agency” (with Mona Simion), invited talk, BSTK 2026 Biennial Conference, University of Oxford.
10 August 2026: “Pure Intellectualism”, Knowledge, Language, and Action, Sitges.
9 August 2026: “Hinge Trust”, commentary on Annalisa Coliva’s Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, book symposium, Sitges.
13 May 2026: “Knowledge and AI” (with Mona Simion), Inquiry Lectures, Young Academy of Europe (online).
4 May 2026: “Comments on Sosa: Negligence and Higher Levels of Knowledge”, book symposium on Ernest Sosa’s The Bounds of Knowledge, University of Seville.
4 May 2026: “On Purism” (with Mona Simion), Knowledge, Action, and Competence, University of Seville.
31 March 2026: “Artificial Epistemic Agency”, AI Epistemics: Knowing in the Age of AI, Onassis Library, Athens.
27 January 2026: “Understanding and Conjunction Closure”, Metaphysics and Epistemology Group, University of Oxford.
11 December 2025: “Understanding and Knowledge Transmission” (with Miloud Belkoniene), Calliope Lectures on Trust and Information, Radboud University (online).
24 October 2025: “Artificial Epistemic Agency” (with Mona Simion), keynote, PhAI 2025, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Past talks: Mona Simion
3 September 2026: “Artificial Epistemic Agency” (with Christoph Kelp), invited talk, BSTK 2026 Biennial Conference, University of Oxford.
10 August 2026: “(When) Statistical Evidence Is not Evidence”, Knowledge, Language, and Action, Sitges.
9 August 2026: commentary on Annalisa Coliva’s Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, book symposium, Sitges.
24–26 June 2026: “Morally and Epistemically Permissible Doubt”, Doubt workshop, Centre for Human Abilities, Freie Universität Berlin.
17–20 June 2026: “On Purism”, Knowledge, Understanding, and the Sciences, Sorbonne Université, Paris.
3–6 June 2026: “Trust in AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness”, Norms in Language-Based Human-AI Interaction, Jagiellonian University, Kraków.
4 May 2026: “On Purism” (with Christoph Kelp), Knowledge, Action, and Competence, University of Seville.
30 March – 1 April 2026: “Knowledge and AI”, AI Epistemics: Knowing in the Age of AI, Onassis Library, Athens.
Past talks: Mariona Miyata-Sturm
3 September 2026: “Aesthetic Theoretical Virtues Will Not Help You Gain Nonfactive Understanding”, BSTK 2026 Biennial Conference, University of Oxford.
23 July 2026: “The Psychological Role of Aesthetic Evaluation in Science”, symposium on aesthetics in science, BSPS Annual Conference 2026, University of Leeds.
10 July 2026: “Aesthetic Theoretical Virtues Will Not Help You Gain Nonfactive Understanding”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Reading.
Full list, kept up to date: KNOW-HOW Talks

