I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow and former editor of the journal Philosophical Topics. From 2001-2019 I taught in the Philosophy Department at the University of Arkansas.
Most of my research is in epistemology (theory of knowledge), philosophy of mind/cognitive science, and especially the places where those areas intersect.
My research in epistemology is guided by the view that empirical findings and theories can usefully constrain epistemological theorizing. I am interested in the nature of epistemic justification in general, also in evidence, perceptual justification, noninferential justification, the internalism/externalism debate, and epistemic defeat. Much of this work defends a kind of process reliabilism.
In the philosophy of mind/cognitive science, I am currently mainly focused on cognitive architecture, modularity, the nature and forms of mental representation, perceptual experience, the cognition/perception distinction and related issues.