CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

2026 BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Venues	Organising team
Schwarzmann Centre: Cinema, Humanities Theatre, Room 00.056, Room 00.308 Exeter College Cohen Quad: Fitzhugh Auditorium, Ruskin Room, Maddicott Room, Marilyn Butler Room, Upper Learning Commons Exeter College Turl Street: Dining Hall, Fellows' Garden	Local Organisers: Bernhard Salow (Oxford), Mona Simion (Oxford) BSTK Liaisons: J. Adam Carter (Glasgow), Christoph Kelp (Birmingham) DPhil support team: Kate Moody, Evie Moss, Vasily Romanovskiy

Sponsors: The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge, Exeter College Oxford, the Cogito Epistemology Research Centre, ERC KNOW-HOW, ERC KnowledgeLab

Tuesday, September 1st

5:00pm – 6:30pm: Welcome Drinks, Upper Learning Commons, Exeter College, Cohen Quad

Conference WiFi:
Network Name: MyExeter
Password: 8jkjciv5xdzq

Wednesday, September 2nd

8:30-8:50	**REGISTRATION**: Reception area, Exeter College Cohen Quad

	Schwarzmann Centre, Humanities Theatre			Schwarzmann Centre, Cinema		
9:00– 9:10	Welcome Remarks from the BSTK Director and Organisers					
9:10–10:10	BSTK Talk: Ofra Magidor (Oxford): The Myth of the De Se Revisited			BSTK Talk: Paul Faulkner (Sheffield) It's OK to Believe AI Chatbots		
10:10–10:20	**BREAK**					
10:20–11:20	BSTK Talk: Bernhard Salow (Oxford): Gnosticism and Inexact Knowledge			BSTK Talk: Corine Besson (Sussex): Knowing How by Imagining		
11:20–11:30	**BREAK**					
11:30–12:30	BSTK Presidential Address: Jessica Brown (St Andrews): What Should I Believe?					
12:30–14:00	**LUNCH: Dakota Café, Exeter College, Cohen Quad**					
	Fitzhugh Auditorium	Ruskin Room	Maddicott Room	Marilyn Butler Room	Room 00.056	Room 00.308
Afternoon Block 1	**Social Epistemology**	**Feminist Epistemology**	**Moral Epistemology**	**Epistemology of Inquiry**	**AI Epistemology**	**Dogmatism Puzzle**

14:00–14:30 **B1**	Daniele Garancini Epistemic Desertification	Jitai Zhang Standpoint epistemology without Relativism: social-situated agent involved in cognitive processing	Jacob Farris Show and Tell: Moral Understanding and Perspectival Moral Testimony	Paulo Pirozelli Epistemic Iteration as a Reinforcement Learning Process	Rory Aird LLMs aren't safe	Andre Dobronic Parola Dogmatism and a knowledge-first account of misleading evidence
14:30–15:00 **B2**	Kyle van Oosterum From Passive Subjects to Active Epistemic Agents: Non-Ideal Epistemology and Community Notes	Sophie Keeling Authority of Marginalisation and the Performing Arts	Dannish Kashmiri Innate Ethical Awareness	Pablo Zendejas Medina Knowledge and the Inquisitive Inquirer	Matt Jope Credit and Blame for Generative AI Use	Kelsey Wengert The Case for Heeding Misleading Evidence
15:00–15:15	**BREAK**					
Afternoon Block 2	**AI Epistemology**	**Social Epistemology**	**Epistemology of Inquiry**	**Closure and Inferential Knowledge**	**Assertion**	**Political Epistemology**
15:15–15:45 **B3**	Michel Croce Epistemic Authority and AI Systems	Piotr Litwin The Needle in a Haystack is Still Shiny. Relevant Alternatives and Failures of Epistemic Deference	Liran Dror Tension Between the Epistemic and the Zetetic: The Bias Avoidance Norm of Inquir	Sang-Ick Kim Irrefutable Gettier's Closure Principle and The Lottery Paradox	Eunseol Lee Assertion, Knowledge, and Public-Intersubjective Justification in Institutional Epistemic Contexts	Gabriele Contessa Political Epistemology: A Pluralist Theory
15:45–16:15 **B4**	Jesus Navarro Repurposing AI with Epistemic Aims	Lara Maassen Rational Agency in Gaslighting	Zofia Zacharova An instrumentalist account of the aim of inquiry	Tom Ralston Arbitrary Reasoning as a Source of Generic Knowledge	Ross Patrizio Gricean maxims as epistemic norms	Valentin Teillet Deliberative Democracy and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
16:15–16:30	**BREAK**					
Afternoon Block 3	**Epistemology of Inquiry**	**Modal Epistemology**	**Epistemic Normativity**	**Virtue Epistemology**	**Social Epistemology**	**Knowledge and Mind**

16:30–17:00 **B5**	Tatiana Sitnikova Bullshit Inquiry	Antonella Mallozzi Dispositions for Modal Knowledge	Javier González de Prado Non-social epistemic normativity	Ethan Lai Fragmentation and Competence	Marcelo Cabral A Defense of Weak Epistemic Individualism	Maciej Tarnowski Belief as an epistemic possibility of knowledge (and its limits)
17:00–17:30 **B6**	Amiya Hashkes Inquiry is an Activity of the Mind	Lilith Mace *Against Doxastic Reduction Accounts of Doubt*	Roman Heil Nobody Cares? Collective Instrumentalism, Trivial Beliefs and the Balance of Epistemic Interests	Manuel Liz and Margarita Vázquez Hyperintensional Machines, Aptness, and the Epistemic Sources of Intensionality	Argun Abrek Canbolat Epistemically Permissible Illusions: Cute-Bait, Practical Rationality, and the Limits of Knowledge by Description	Rhys Borchert A Centrist Epistemology
17:30–18:00 **B7**	Matthew Vermaire Practical Zetetics	Marc Lara Crosas Better Normic Than Safe	Joel Yalland Epistemic Goods and the Repugnant Conclusion	Taylor Matthews Reliabilism and Incompetence	Dominik Jarczewski Systemic Environmentalist Epistemology: Epistemic Wasting and the Ecology of Knowledge Production	Amit Karmon Computational Complexity and Knowability

18:45-19:30	**PRE-DINNER DRINKS**: Fellows' Garden, Exeter College, Turl Street
19:30-22:00	**CONFERENCE DINNER**: Dining Hall, Exeter College, Turl Street

Thursday, September 3rd

	Schwarzmann Centre, Humanities Theatre	Schwarzmann Centre, Cinema
9:00–10:00	BSTK Talk: Mona Simion (Oxford) and Christoph Kelp (Birmingham) Artificial Epistemic Agency	BSTK Talk: Martin Smith (Edinburgh): Probability, Normalcy, and the Ethics of Risk
10:00–10:10	**BREAK**	
10:10–11:10	BSTK Talk: Alexander Bird (Cambridge): Against Empiricism	BSTK Talk: Matt McGrath (WashU): Epistemic and Zetetic Conflicts
11:10–11:20	**BREAK**	
11:20–12:20	BSTK Keynote Talk: Timothy Williamson (Oxford): Why Is Knowledge First?	

12:20–14:00	**LUNCH: Dakota Café, Exeter College, Cohen Quad**					
	Fitzhugh Auditorium	Ruskin Room	Maddicott Room	Marilyn Butler Room	Room 00.056	Room 00.308
Afternoon Block 1	**Pragmatic and Moral Encroachment**	**Epistemology of Science**	**Scepticism**	**Hinge Epistemology**	**Epistemic Authority and Defeat**	**AI Testimony**
14:00–14:30 **B8**	Caroline Hoskins Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Moral Encroachment in Criminal Trials	Mariona Miyata-Sturm Aesthetic theoretical virtues will not help you gain nonfactive understanding	Chenyang Lu Rethinking Center Indifference in Boltzmann Brain	Ignacio Gómez-Ledo Not All Hinges Are Equal: Entitlement, Genealogy, and the Normative Standing of Hinges	João Fett Unjustified Defeaters and the Role of Incoherence in Epistemic Defeat	Masashi Kasaki & Shun Tsugita The Prompt-Responsive View of AI Testimonial Warrant
14:30–15:00 **B9**	Nicholas Shackel Stakes and Full Belief.	Jiarui Qu Selecting the criteria of model selection	Tammo Lossau (Politically) Radical Skepticism: An approach from Zhuangzi	Swithin Thomas Two presuppositions of hinge epistemology	Arnon Keren Authority and Track Record	Will Gopal Defending Human Anti-Reductionism and
15:00–15:15	**BREAK**					
Afternoon Block 2	**Social Epistemology**	**Epistemology of Science**	**AI Epistemology**	**History**	**The Nature of Knowledge**	**Knowledge and Action**
15:15–15:45 **B10**	Michael Hannon Believing in Philosophy	Tetsuo KISHI Are Scientific Theories Justified?	Nastasia Mueller Trust as Mechanism: Rethinking Rational Trust and Its Application to AI	Simon Wimmer Is Objectual Knowledge Just Factual Knowledge?	Jinwoo Heo Against Beliefless Knowledge	Ken Howarth Judgment, Adequacy, and Epistemic Governance
15:45–16:15 **B11**	Katie Moody Testimonial Framing	Patric Harting Knowledge-Likeness: A Framework for Epistemic Progress	Wenli Yao Is Generative Artificial Intelligence an Instrument or an Expert?	Julio Pérez García From Epistēmē to 'Knowledge': Why Gettier Epistemology Chased an Unattainable Ideal.	Avram Hiller How to Divide Knowledge into Internal and External Components	Alejandro Vesga Acting on Truth: An Action-First Norm of Belief
16:15–16:30	**BREAK**					
Afternoon Block 3	**The Nature of Knowledge**	**Social Epistemology**	**Testimony**	**Knowledge and Mind**	**Virtue Epistemology**	**Epistemic Injustice**

16:30–17:00 **B12**	Jordan Scott Knowledge, Success, and the Epistemic Method	Fenner Stanley Tanswell The Cybersecurity of Knowledge	Jack Herbert Testimonial Success and Social Norms	Krisztian Kos Exploring Attributions of Affective States: The Affective Picture	Giovanni Dusi Against the SkShSi structure of competence	Kunimasa Sato Narrative Injustice
17:00–17:30 **B13**	Jaakko Hirvelä The Epistemic Continuum	Lola M. Vizuete and Dani Pino Understanding Hermeneutical Injustice: A Practices-First Approach	Ísak Andri Ólafsson Credibility Risk and the Evaluation of Weak Evidence	Julian Ratcliffe Irrelevant Influences and Contingent Belief	Suprotik Chakrabarti Two responses to Modal Virtue Epistemology	Guido Tana Non-Ideal Epistemology and the Duty to Engage
17:30–18:00 **B14**	—	—	—	—	Yousuf Hasan, Muqadasa Faqiri, and Sarir Ahmad Epistemic Agency in Democratic Education	Lou Thomine An amendment to Lackey's Wide Norm of credibility

Friday, September 4th

	Schwarzmann Centre, Humanities Theatre			Schwarzmann Centre, Cinema		
9:00–10:00	BSTK Talk: Alison Hills (Oxford): Moral Understanding and Progress in Moral Philosophy			BSTK Talk: Julia Staffel (Colorado): The Planning Fallacy and the Agent's Perspective		
10:00–10:10	**BREAK**					
10:10–11:10	BSTK Talk: J. Adam Carter (Glasgow): Good Moves: A Framework for Telic Know-How			BSTK Talk: Kathrin Glüer (Stockholm) and Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm): Epistemic Normativity?		
11:10–11:20	**BREAK**					
11:20–12:20	BSTK Talk: Clayton Littlejohn (ACU): Disinformation and Choice			BSTK Talk: Lizzie Fricker (Oxford): Can Understanding be Possessed at Second-Hand?		
12:20–12:30	**BREAK**					
12:30–14:10	**LUNCH: Dakota Café, Exeter College, Cohen Quad**					
	Fitzhugh Auditorium	Ruskin Room	Maddicott Room	Marilyn Butler Room	Room 00.056	Room 00.308
Afternoon Block 1	**Justifcation, Basing and Appreciating**	**Epistemology and Ethics**	**Misinformation, Disinformation, and Ignorance**	**Self-knowledge**	**Knowledge and Language**	**Understanding**

14:10–14:40 **B15**	Auke Montessori On the Need for Appreciation	Tim Smartt Ethics and Epistemology: Two Different Animals	Dani Pino & Juanma Poyatos Disinformation beyond Ignorance: An Understanding-First Account for Crowd Epistemology	Sophia Arbeiter Anti-Luminosity and Detectivism	Christos Kyriacou Epistemic Rationality, Eliteness and Reference Magnetism	Yotam Harel The Value of Understanding: Should Mental States Count?
14:40–15:10 **B16**	Mikael Janvid How the Debasing Demon Helped the Tortoise	Jorren Dykstra An Excuse for Excuses	Eduardo Quirino Disinformation is about evidence, not belief.	Asa Zabarsky A Problem for Reflectivist Accounts of Self-Knowledge	Tyler Porter Concept Comandeering	Rayan Geha The structure of objectual understanding
15:10–15:40 **B17**	Murali Ramachandran The Surprise Exam and the Surprise-Dependence Block	Caroline von Klemperer Don't be Ignorant! Morally-Mediated Positive Epistemic Duties	Frances Darling Ignoring Ignoring	Sorin Moisescu Self-Knowledge and Second-Order Knowledge by the Lens of Sensation	—	—
15:40–16:00	**BREAK**					
Afternoon Block 2	**Norms of Belief**	**Evidence Resistance**	**Epistemology of Logic**	**History**	**Epistemology of Medicine**	**Knowledge How**
16:00–16:30 **B18**	Rebecca Bailey The Distinction Between True Beliefs and Getting Things Right: Reevaluating the Aim of Belief	Somayeh Tohidi Rational Resistance to Correction: A Bayesian Analysis of the Continued Influence Effect	Sebastian Horvat Logical Truth and Perception	Iuliia Burtceva Epistemology of Exemplarity in Plato's Dialogues	Regina Hurley Who Should Doctors Doubt?: Managing Doubt Amid Diagnostic Uncertainty	Sukhvinder Shahi Novelty and Contrastive Know How
16:30–17:00 **B19**	Daniele Sgaravatti The Aim of Belief Without Positive Epistemic Duties	Chenwei Nie Rational People's Irrational Beliefs	Thibault Rushbrooke Is Logic Distinctively Normative?	Abdurrahman Ali Mihirig Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.1210) Against the Analysis of Knowledge: An Unrecognized Episode in the History of Knowledge-First Epistemology	Gabriel Malagutti Medical AI: Justification and Responsibility	Satsuki Inoue & Masaki Kondo The Intellectualist Theory of Know How and the Theory of Facts and Propositions

ABSTRACTS

Listed alphabetically by first name

Abdurrahman Ali Mihirig

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.1210) Against the Analysis of Knowledge: An Unrecognized Episode in the History of Knowledge-First Epistemology

University of Oxford · abdurrahman.mihirig@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's held that knowledge could not be analysed. Rāzī was an Ashʿarī philosopher, which meant he was trained in a tradition which already considered knowledge to be fundamental. Nevertheless, whether knowledge could be defined was a matter of dispute. The study looks at prior attempts to define knowledge. Of note is al-Harrāsī, who presents an inductive argument against the definability of knowledge. Rāzī builds then offers his own arguments against the analysis of knowledge, concluding that nothing can be defined.

Alejandro Vesga

Acting on Truth: An Action-First Norm of Belief

University of Houston · ajvesgaplazas@uh.edu

I offer an action-first explanation of epistemic demands on belief by appealing to the structure of intentional agency, rather than to the nature of belief itself. Intentions set standards of success for action, and their fulfillment requires intentional action to be predicated on true beliefs: false beliefs prevent agents from doing what they intended as intended. Hence, I argue, epistemic demands on belief are constitutive of our agency. This explains the value of truth through the value of agency and the inescapability of epistemic demands, even if belief has non-epistemic functions and even if there are practical reasons for belief.

Alexander Bird

Against Empiricism

University of Cambridge · ajb368@cam.ac.uk

I examine the motivations for being an empiricist and find them all wanting.

Alison Hills

Moral Understanding and Progress in Moral Philosophy

University of Oxford · alison.hills@philosophy.oxford..ac.uk

I consider whether moral philosophy increases our moral understanding. My focus is on explanatory moral understanding (understanding why). I evaluate arguments that moral philosophy does not increase our moral understanding (e.g. there is too much disagreement, the methods of inferential argument do not increase understanding, the method of counterexample produces theories that are too complex, moral understanding requires the right kind of experiences). I argue for optimism that moral philosophy can improve our explanatory moral understanding. But it is unlikely to improve what I call our "full moral understanding", a kind of understanding which includes a practical as well as an intellectual grasp of moral reasons.

Amit Karmon

Computational Complexity and Knowability

University of Oxford · karmonamit@gmail.com

I argue that computational complexity theory is much more relevant to epistemology than epistemologists usually take it to be. The computational resources available in the universe are bounded. Thus, under the assumption that learning is a computational process, computational complexity places bounds on what is learnable and therefore on what is knowable. I discuss three objections to this line of reasoning and argue that modern cryptography can be used to address all three.

Amiya Hashkes
Inquiry is an Activity of the Mind
University of St Andrews · ah428@st-andrews.ac.uk
This paper introduces the mental process account (MPA) of inquiry, which defines inquiry as the mental activity of reasoning to answer a question. The MPA succeeds in capturing paradigm cases of inquiry while excluding cases of faux inquiries. Compared to central alternatives – the interrogative attitudes, intentions, and naive teleological accounts – the MPA accommodates their motivations while avoiding their pitfalls. I conclude by suggesting that defining inquiry matters for determining zetetic norms: unlike accounts restricting inquirers' permissible attitudes, thus leading to restrictive ignorance norms, the MPA remains neutral, leading to no such controversial restrictions.

Andre Dobronic Parola
Dogmatism and a knowledge-first account of misleading evidence
CUNY · andre.dobronicparola59@gc.cuny.edu
I will argue for a novel approach to the "dogmatism puzzle" by considering the nature of misleading evidence. The dogmatism puzzle is formulated as an argument with the prima facie implausible conclusion that if one knows p, then one may ignore any evidence against p. The argument relies on the premiss that evidence is misleading if it is evidence against a truth. I will argue, rather, that evidence is misleading only if belief in said evidence leads to a loss in knowledge. Assuming that evidence is propositional, I develop this view through a novel bi-modal logic of knowledge and belief.

Antonella Mallozzi
Dispositions for Modal Knowledge
Providence College · amalloz1@providence.edu
Dispositionalist theories of modality hold that objects' dispositions determine corresponding possibilities; knowing dispositions, in turn, yields knowledge of possibilities. This is a naturalistic alternative to possible world analysis which also aims to simplify modal epistemology. Particularly, potentialism grounds modality in potentialities and links modal knowledge to awareness of abilities and affordances. I argue that dispositionalist approaches face an "Access Problem": they cannot explain knowledge of the non-actual. Furthermore, potentialism's reliance on essence generates a twofold "Priority Problem," making essences epistemically and metaphysically prior to potentialities.

Argun Abrek Canbolat
Epistemically Permissible Illusions: Cute-Bait, Practical Rationality, and the Limits of Knowledge by Description
University of Oxford · aabrekcanbolat@gmail.com
In this talk, I connect Bertrand Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description to the post-truth condition. Rather than focusing only on misinformation, I examine a fragility within descriptive knowledge itself: we rely on chains of reference whose trustworthiness we cannot fully guarantee. I use "cute-bait,"emotionally appealing online content with uncertain ties to reality,to show how ordinary belief already depends on such fragile assumptions. Drawing on practical rationality and Harari's account of information networks, I ask whether epistemology should also recognize descriptions that sustain motivation, affect, and action without secure reference.

Arnon Keren
Authority and Track Record
University of Haifa · akeren@research.haifa.ac.il
Zagzebski (2012) Track Record Argument for a preemptionist account of epistemic authority is based on Raz's (1986) argument for preemptionism about practical authority. Zagzebski claims that if Raz's argument is sound, then it does not matter whether the "authority's judgment is about what to do or what to believe." Against this, I argue that while Raz's argument is not sound, it can be fixed. However, Raz's corrected argument cannot be successfully adopted to the case of belief. Thus, it does indeed matter whether the authority's judgment is about what to do or about what to believe.

Asa Zabarsky
A Problem for Reflectivist Accounts of Self-Knowledge
Harvard University · asa.zabarsky@g.harvard.edu
Matthew Boyle has recently argued for a condition of adequacy on transparency accounts of self-knowledge that I will call *Boyle's constraint*. He wields this constraint against several rival transparency accounts, claiming that they fail to meet it and should therefore be rejected. It also informs a central metaphysical commitment of his own transparency account, *reflectivism*.

In this talk, I'll first introduce the transparency approach to self-knowledge and Boyle's constraint, focusing on the case of belief in the interest of time and simplicity. I'll then argue that Boyle's motivating considerations support, at most, a much more restricted constraint, one that cannot play the dialectical role he hoped for. I'll then turn to the metaphysical commitment just mentioned and argue that once Boyle's original constraint is replaced with the revised one, we have good reason to suspect that this commitment is false.

Auke Montessori
On the Need for Appreciation
University of Glasgow · aukemontessori@gmail.com
I argue that successfully using evidence to gain knowledge requires appreciating its evidential relevance for that knowledge. I show this by invoking common cases and argue that we cannot successfully analyze these cases by invoking alternative notions like evidence possession, taking, or knowledge/beliefs/intuitions about evidential relations. A dispositional account of appreciation, on which appreciating evidence is being disposed to draw the correct conclusions from it in both actual and nearby cases, fares much better. Appreciation can thus account for certain core cases, that are otherwise very difficult to account for.

Avram Hiller
How to Divide Knowledge into Internal and External Components
Portland State University · ahiller@pdx.edu
This paper shows that knowledge can be elegantly divided into internal and external components. Consider soundness, which does not have an independent 'true conclusion' condition. Still, sound arguments always have true conclusions, given validity plus true premises. Likewise, I argue, knowledge does not have any condition that by itself entails truth, but can be analyzed as (internalist, fallibilist) justified belief plus what I call a 'regularity' condition, which is external. I show that these conditions together entail truth. This composite 'K=JRB' analysis is internalism-friendly and explains action and epistemic norms at least as well as prime mental state accounts.

Bernhard Salow
Gnosticism and Inexact Knowledge
University of Oxford · bernhard.salow@magd.ox.ac.uk
Consequentialist gnosticism holds that a belief is rational just in case it is sufficiently likely to constitute knowledge. I show that this view makes implausible dynamic predictions when combined with the most influential models of the kind of 'inexact knowledge' we have in cases involving imprecise measurement or repeated chance processes. These models, built on the idea that such knowledge requires a margin for error, allow that one can have 'improbable knowledge', i.e. that one can know something even though it is unlikely (given one's evidence, or given how one's belief was formed) that one knows it. The problems can be alleviated by rejecting this idea, but this may force us to deny that knowledge requires a margin for error.

Caroline Hoskins
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Moral Encroachment in Criminal Trials
Rutgers University · caroline.hoskins@rutgers.edu
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof (BRD) for criminal trials is closely linked to the principle that one should not be deprived of liberty unless the fact-finder is highly confident of one's guilt. I first make the descriptive claim that BRD is best understood in the context of moral encroachment because it imposes a higher standard of epistemic justification for the belief that a defendant is guilty given the moral stakes of criminal conviction. Next, I argue that moral encroachment fares better in the context of the legal system than it does for epistemic practices generally.

Caroline von Klemperer
Don't be Ignorant! Morally-Mediated Positive Epistemic Duties
Idaho State University · vonklempererc@gmail.com
Many hold that we have negative epistemic doxastic duties. Recent work defends other doxastic duties: positive epistemic doxastic duties, negative moral doxastic duties, negative moral encroachment-motivated epistemic doxastic duties, positive practice-generated epistemic doxastic duties, etc. Here I argue for doxastic duties that are unrecognized: morally-mediated epistemic doxastic duties. I contend that we have moral attentional and zetetic duties the fulfillment of which yields positive or negative epistemic doxastic obligations. Understanding such duties helps make sense of morally loaded demands to not be ignorant and to remain ignorant without encroachment or moral norms on belief.

Chenwei Nie
Rational People's Irrational Beliefs
University of Warwick · chenwei.nie@warwick.ac.uk
Why does an ordinary person sometimes obstinately hold on to a belief against independent evidence? Existing approaches often treat such cases as irrational, claiming that non-evidential factors either distort how evidence is gathered and assessed or function as direct reasons for the belief. This paper proposes an alternative account that does not assume such irrationality. It argues that non-evidential factors may instead shape the person's seeming experience. Consequently, the person faces an epistemic dilemma: independent evidence counts against the belief, while a compelling seeming supports it. The belief is adopted and maintained because the seeming outweighs the independent evidence.

Chenyang Lu
Rethinking Center Indifference in Boltzmann Brain
Western Michigan University · chenyang.lu@wmich.edu

Dogramaci and Schoenfield (2025) reject Center Indifference against Boltzmann Brain (BB) skepticism, while Pittard (forthcoming) defends it. I argue BB skepticism neither refutes Center Indifference (CI) nor follows from retaining it. BB cases involve necessarily old evidence, so epistemic probabilities should be understood as degrees of objective evidential support, not confidence. Thus evaluated, their positions hinge on attitudes toward the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that updating on less specific de re evidence falsifies DS's premise for deriving absurd results against CI. Independently, DS's likelihood insight can resist BB skepticism while preserving CI.

Christos Kyriacou
Epistemic Rationality, Eliteness and Reference Magnetism
University of Cyprus · ckiriakou@gmail.com
Epistemic rationality, eliteness and reference magnetism
I argue that epistemic rationality is an explanatory indispensable, elite, referentially magnetic property in the sense that the corresponding predicate must minimally reliably refer to the rationality property (as if the property has magnetic qualities and attracts the predicate's reference). As I understand eliteness, roughly, elite properties are metaphysically fundamental properties that are objectively explanatorily indispensable for rational argument. I take it that such elite properties and relations include epistemic rationality, reference and truth.

Clayton Littlejohn
Title: Disinformation and Choice
Australian Catholic University · cmlittlejohn@gmail.com
In some circles, disinformation is characterised in epistemic terms (e.g., content that's likely to induce false belief; content that obstructs access to epistemic goods). In some, it is characterised in more overtly practical terms (e.g., information that's used to gain strategic advantage over an adversary). Purely epistemic accounts face the problem that our intuitions about whether something is disinformation often seem sensitive to assumptions about the non-epistemic relations that hold between receiver and senders or third parties who intervene to modify a sender's signal. Injecting noise into a system might seem oppositional relative to one set of ends, but beneficial relative to another. Choosing to send the information that confers the greatest epistemic benefit seems benevolent in some practical settings but constitutes constructive fraud in others. A more overtly practical characterisation of disinformation can address these concerns while also explaining why it seems paradigmatic forms of disinformation involve something like deception (on a very broad understanding). In most cases, the signals that degrade the value of information do so by protecting informational asymmetries that the sender enjoys (or by undermining the receiver's attempts at gaining such an informational advantage themselves). The practical approach outlined implies that senders that send signals that provide uniform epistemic benefits relative to an initial state or the maximum epistemic benefit relative to their signalling options can be guilty of creating and/or distributing disinformation. The account suggests that it is better to think of disinformation as a tool for reflexive control than as an instrument for epistemic injury.

Corine Besson
Knowing How by Imagining
University of Sussex · c.besson@sussex.ac.uk
What is the connection between knowing how to do something and having the skill to do it? If Alice knows how to make a cake, that suggests that she has the skill to make one. But what about Sarah? Sarah is a ski instructor who used to be a champion at backflips but an accident has left her permanently unable to do one. And what about Tonya? Tonya can teach you how to do a backflip but was never able to do one. Arguably, Sarah and Tonya know how to do a backflip even if they don't possess the skill to do one. Examples like these have generated discussion concerning the kinds of skill, if any, that might be involved in knowing how. I argue that they suggest that knowing how to φ does not require the skill to φ but may rather involve a closely related skill, such as the skill to y, where y is the skill to reliably imagine φ-ing, or the skill to reliably extrapolate from x-ing to the case of φ-ing.

Dannish Kashmiri
Innate Ethical Awareness
Unaffiliated · dannish.kashmiri@gmail.com
How can we have epistemic access to a mind-independent and non-natural ethical reality? I present the view that human beings possess an innate, contentless and irreducibly ethical capacity. I advance the following architecture of ethical intuition: 1) Innateness concerns the capacity itself, not innate propositions, rules or knowledge. 2) Its primitive exercise constitutes sui generis, non-propositional and non-inferential ethical awareness, not a domain-general intellectual seeming with ethical content. 3) Emotion and imagination may enable ethical intuition without constituting it. 4) Primitive ethical awareness can subsequently be formed into propositional ethical cognition.

Dani Pino
Disinformation beyond Ignorance: An Understanding-First Account for Crowd Epistemology
Universidad de Granada · danipino@ugr.es
Knowledge-first accounts define disinformation as content disposed to generate ignorance, understood as lack of knowledge (Simion 2024). We argue this is incomplete, and remains so even for collective agents (Bird 2024). Some disinformation leaves a group's propositional knowledge intact while degrading its understanding: the capacity to integrate what it knows into a structure that guides inquiry. We propose Crowd-Sensitive Disinformation, the disposition to degrade a group's shared explanatory map, of which generating ignorance is a limiting case. The distinctive harm of disinformation, we conclude, is the closing of collective inquiry.

Daniele Garancini
Epistemic Desertification
Ludwig Maximilians Universität Munchen · garancini.daniele@lmu.de
The literature on epistemic injustice tends to concentrate on how people can be wronged in their capacity as knowers, but as Coady observed and Fricker acknowledged, there can also be epistemic injustice when people are wrongly prevented from becoming knowers. This paper offers a taxonomy of this second kind of epistemic injustice. In particular, the discussion draws on the literature about online misinformation and social media harm to describe three different ways in which people may be unjustly stuck in an epistemic desert, an environment in which knowledge is scarce. One upshot of this analysis is that some of the people who perpetuate injustice by ignoring or misconstruing the testimony of knowers may themselves be victims of a different sort of injustice: their epistemic space has become a desert.

Daniele Sgaravatti
The Aim of Belief Without Positive Epistemic Duties
University of Bologna · daniele_sgaravatti@yahoo.it
A challenge for the view that beliefs aim at truth is to explain how we balance the goals of having true beliefs and avoiding false ones.
I consider the following line of reply. There are no positive epistemic duties and, if this is so, there is nothing to balance, we only need to avoid false beliefs.
I will argue that, even under that assumption, the view that the function of beliefs is to achieve knowledge is superior, since it posits a natural epistemic aim, and it explains why the situation in which we lack all beliefs is not ideal.

Dominik Jarczewski
Systemic Environmentalist Epistemology: Epistemic Wasting and the Ecology of Knowledge Production
Jagiellonian University · dominik.jarczewski@uj.edu.pl
I develop Systemic Environmentalist Epistemology (SEE), a systems-theoretic extension of functionalism that evaluates epistemic practices through efficiency, sustainability, and resilience rather than knowledge production alone. I illustrate it through expert testimony amid misinformation and gullibility: uncritically trusting experts yields immediate

knowledge but degrades critical capacities. SEE models this trade-off between competing resources—expert recognition and individual excellence—by diagnosing resource trajectories near depletion thresholds. This perspective enables targeted, resource-preserving interventions unavailable to standard frameworks.

Eduardo Quirino
Disinformation is about evidence, not belief.
Vechta University · eduardoquirinio@gmail.com
In this paper, I argue for a review in the conception of disinformation. I start building from Simion's conception of disinformation orthodoxy, and adding two new criteria that even her account seems to assume. I show that these two criteria fail to give an account of a few desiderata that, I argue, any theory of disinformation would need to tackle. I claim the failure is due to an emphasis in the effects of disinformation on belief-formation. I briefly propose an alternative that focus on disinformation's impact on the perception of evidence and its quality.

Ethan Lai
Fragmentation and Competence
University of St Andrews · lph.ethan@gmail.com
This paper presents Competence-Based Fragmentation. It keeps the fragmentation framework and emphasises conceptual competence as the condition for closure. Drawing on Marconi's (1997) two-component account of lexical competence and Williamson's (2025b) epistemic reading of referential capacities, I distinguish two thresholds: knowledge requires minimal competence, and closure requires sufficient competence. To know a proposition, you must have minimal competence with the constituent concepts. To close your knowledge by inference, you must have sufficient competence with the concepts that do the inferential work, that is, those that differ between premise and conclusion.

Eunseol Lee
Assertion, Knowledge, and Public-Intersubjective Justification in Institutional Epistemic Contexts
Université Libre de Bruxelles · eunseol.lee@hotmail.com
This paper argues that assertion norms may need to be understood differently in institutional epistemic contexts including criminal adjudication. The Knowledge Norm is too restrictive because participants may properly assert propositions they do not personally know, while justification-based accounts focus too narrowly on individual speakers. I propose a Public-Intersubjective Justification Norm, according to which institutional assertions are proper when supported by reasons and evidence that can be publicly assessed under appropriate procedures. The criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt illustrates this model and clarifies the epistemic structure of collective decision-making.

Fenner Stanley Tanswell
The Cybersecurity of Knowledge
TU Berlin · f.tanswell@tu-berlin.de
An overlooked dimension of social epistemology is how groups can cultivate and defend collective knowledge despite hostile or malicious attempts to undermine it. I draw on fundamental concepts from cybersecurity research (confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation) to understand how collective knowledge is created, maintained, and, crucially, defended over time. This perspective highlights how groups can form and justify collective beliefs despite malicious actors or a hostile epistemic environment, and how cybersecurity and trust are related.

Frances Darling
Ignoring Ignoring
University of Glasgow · f.darling.1@research.gla.ac.uk
Ignorance and Ignoring: Ignorance and ignoring require disambiguation. Ignorance is a state; ignoring is an act. They can be related but are distinct phenomena. I argue that theorists of resilient ignorance-types nominalise both phenomena under “ignorance”, obscuring their distinctness via infelicitous attribution or description. This is overlooked by those seeking a single conception of stative ignorance which accommodates both the basic state of ignorance and resilient ignorance-types. Consequently, these accounts fail; we should not expect one conception to cover both the basic state and forms of typed “ignorance”, as conceptions of the latter denote compound stative-active phenomena.

Gabriel Malagutti
Email: gabrielmalagutti@edu.ulisboa.pt
University of Lisbon, LanCog · gabrielmalagutti@edu.ulisboa.pt
Despite reliability, the opacity of Medical AIs, it has been argued, makes the usage and reliance on MAIs unjustified. The intuition in play is a Non-opacity condition (NOC), where opacity is incompatible with justification or knowledge. The goal of this paper is to reject NOCs, preserving justification. First, NOCs are too strong and make standard cases of knowledge unjustified. Second, Alvarado's (2026) opacity towards error conditions is considered and rejected due to being overdemanding. Third, pragmatic encroachment and appeals to epistemic norms in the medical field - Patient Centered Medicine Practices (PCM) - are considered but rejected for they are incompatible with opacity.

Gabriele Contessa
Political Epistemology: A Pluralist Theory
Carleton University · g.contessa@gmail.com
Political epistemology is dominated by theories that treat most political attitudes as alike. Against this approach, I develop a pluralist theory that distinguishes genuine political beliefs from non-doxastic political attitudes such as political avowals (non-truth-directed attitudes serving expressive, conative, or affective functions) and political endorsements (non-truth-directed attitudes incurred as a result of a public commitment to a view). I argue that this theory has two important consequences: that motivated reasoning plays little or no role in political epistemology, and that our tendency to blame political opponents for their political beliefs is largely unjustifiable.

Giovanni Dusi
Against the SkShSi structure of competence
University of Barcelona · giovanni.dusi@gmail.com
The SkShSi hypothesis explains competence—the disposition to succeed—as constituted by skill (Sk), shape (Sh), and situation (Si). Introduced by Ernest Sosa, it is a pillar of virtue epistemology. In this article, I argue that it is incorrect for two main reasons. First, it is incomplete because it omits knowledge as a component of competence. Second, it is insufficiently discriminatory because it fails to distinguish skill from competence. Furthermore, I show that a skilled but non-knowledgeable agent remains incompetent, suggesting that knowledge is explanatorily prior to competence. I conclude by outlining a roadmap towards an alternative competence structure model.

Guido Tana
Non-Ideal Epistemology and the Duty to Engage
Universidade Nova de Lisboa · tanaguido@gmail.com

Non-ideal epistemology holds that epistemic norms are not valid independently of the contexts in which they are applied. Crucially, it rejects the general epistemic duty to engage with criticism. In polluted epistemic environments characterized by injustice, engagement produces harm.
We argue that, although there's no universal duty to engage with challenges, positive epistemic standing is nonetheless partly determined by critical interaction with other agents. Drawing on real-world cases of epistemic injustice or hostile contexts, we argue that a conception of epistemic statuses based on the practice of giving and asking for reasons is a better fit for Non-Ideal Epistemology than available alternatives.

Ignacio Gómez-Ledo
Not All Hinges Are Equal: Entitlement, Genealogy, and the Normative Standing of Hinges
University of Seville · igngomled@hotmail.com
Hinge epistemology typically treats hinges as commitments that are beyond evidential justification because they make inquiry possible. I argue that this picture captures only part of the normative landscape of hinges. Focusing on recent developments in social hinge epistemology, I argue that distinguishing between oppressive and emancipatory hinges requires recognizing a second source of hinge normativity: historically earned warrant. While some hinges are sustained by default entitlement, others acquire stronger epistemic standing through the historical and intercultural processes by which they come to structure inquiry. This approach explains why not all hinges deserve equal authority.

Ísak Andri Ólafsson
Credibility Risk and the Evaluation of Weak Evidence
University of Iceland · isak.andri.olafsson@gmail.com
Standard accounts of testimony hold that a hearer's warrant in believing p is a function of speaker reliability and the prior probability of p; when the supporting evidence is weak, testimony generates only weak warrant. I argue this neglects credibility risk: the risk involved when a speaker chooses to present evidence likely to be disbelieved. That choice is itself epistemically informative. A liar is not constrained by what occurred and, preferring to be believed, will produce stronger evidence where he can. Where evidence is easily exaggerated, weak evidence carries a credibility risk premium. Strong evidence carries a corresponding discount.

Iuliia Burtceva
Epistemology of Exemplarity in Plato's Dialogues
University of Technology Nuremberg and University of Vienna · iuliia.burtceva@utn.de
Epistemology of Exemplarity in Plato's Dialogues. Examples occupy an unstable place in epistemology. They are indispensable in inquiry, teaching, argumentation, and concept-formation; yet their epistemic force is difficult to specify. Do examples justify, illustrate, train recognition, guide application, or merely persuade? This study argues that the Platonic dialogues develop a sophisticated practice of exemplary reasoning. Examples are not merely illustrative or decorative. They operate as cognitive tools within the argumentative dynamics of the dialogues.

Jaakko Hirvelä
The Epistemic Continuum
University of Helsinki · jaakko.hirvela@helsinki.fi
How are epistemic goods like knowledge, justification, and certainty connected? I argue they lie on a continuum and can be understood in terms of the possibility of error. Knowing requires that the possibility of believing what is false is sufficiently slim. Justification requires that the possibility of knowing is sufficiently high. Certainty requires that the possibility that one knows is maximal. The view predicts that certainty entails knowledge and maximal degree of justification, and that there are instances of unreasonable knowledge. Moreover, it entails that knowledge doesn't satisfy a positive introspection principle, but certainty does, giving rise to an error-theory.

J. Adam Carter
Good Moves: A Framework for Telic Know-How
University of Glasgow · adam.carter@glasgow.ac.uk
To know how to complete a goal-directed (i.e., telic) task, I argue, is to possess a stable, trainable disposition that implements a good policy for choosing moves within the task space, viz., one that reliably lowers the risk of failure across the situations the task presents. Propositional knowledge and motor skill are, on this picture, not rival candidates for what know-how is. Rather, they fill two complementary roles within a single competence. One governs which moves are generated as candidates, the other how well a chosen move is executed. The matter of which particular role, in a given task, bears comparatively more of the demand varies with the domain. Knowing how to cook a risotto or play a simple music scale typically relies more on execution, whereas knowing how to win a senate race or make a profit in day trading typically relies more on judgment about what to try, and on the having the discipline to suppress going for tempting but bad options. The same division lines up with two grades of credit we already pretheoretically draw, that is, for a performance that's well brought off (attributability credit), and for a call the agent can be held answerable for (accountability credit). Know-how also, on the view proposed, comes apart from the ability to succeed, in both directions. A strategist making flawless calls in a hopeless campaign district can manifest her know-how in losing, whereas, one who relies almost entirely on an opponent collapsing manifests none (or very little) in winning.

Jack Herbert
Testimonial Success and Social Norms
University of Sheffield · jackherbertphilosophy@gmail.com
Our testimonial practices are strikingly successful in that they very often yield knowledge. What explains this success? One suggestion is that speakers generally conform to a social norm of truth-telling. Call this Social Norm Theory (SNT). I argue that SNT is explanatorily inadequate. To show this, I appeal to empirical findings which suggest that a stable disposition to report truths can persist even in cases where a responsiveness to factors that help sustain conformity to social norms is diminished. This gives us reason to believe that social normativity does not play the explanatory role SNT defenders suggest it does.

Jacob Farris
Show and Tell: Moral Understanding and Perspectival Moral Testimony
Georgetown University · jf1768@georgetown.edu
Why does moral testimony seem "fishy"? The leading answer is that it cannot transmit moral understanding. But testimony can, in fact, deliver understanding. By telling stories or using other interpretive frames, we can communicate our perspectives through testimony, including what we see as explanatorily significant. I argue that the cases typically discussed in this literature seem fishy not because moral testimony is a defective source of moral knowledge, but because they are defective instances of moral testimony. A good moral testifier would not simply tell us what is right or wrong. She would also show us how she sees things.

Javier González de Prado
Non-social epistemic normativity
UNED · jgonzalezdeprado@gmail.com
What is the normative force of epistemic norms governing doxastic states (for instance, evidentialist norms for belief)? An attractive idea is that these norms derive from our goals as inquirers (see Friedman 2020). I will argue, however, that this view fails to account for what I call the inescapability of epistemic norms. This is so even if we appeal to collective goals of inquiry (Dyke 2021; Fleisher 2025; Hannon and Woodard 2025). Instead, I propose to think of these norms as introduced by the regulatory dispositions constitutive of doxastic deliberation.

Jessica Brown
What should I believe?
University of St Andrews · jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
It's increasingly popular to defend the idea that there are epistemic duties understood not merely as duties concerning epistemic things, but duties with a distinctively epistemic flavour. However, it's hard to formulate the positive epistemic duty to believe what the evidence supports in a way which is neither too broad nor too narrow. Furthermore, critics allege that insofar as we have duties to believe what the evidence supports these are practical or perhaps moral in nature. In this paper, I want to focus on one of the most sophisticated recent defences of epistemic duties to see whether it can overcome these problems, that given by McGrath. Despite its sophistication, I will argue that his account faces serious problems. Furthermore, I will argue that the problems generalise to other prominent defences of epistemic duties.

Jesus Navarro
Repurposing AI with Epistemic Aims
University of Seville · jnr@us.es
On some recent approaches to the epistemic normativity of artificial intelligence — most prominently Simion and Kelp (2023) —, AI systems are epistemically evaluated by reference to the functions they are intended to perform. Such approaches are ill-equipped to address a distinctive and long-standing challenge generated by technology in general: namely, that functional success itself tends to produce disempowerment. By contrast, an aims-based account provides the resources to distinguish epistemic improvement from epistemic empowerment. On this view, normatively appropriate uses of AI are guided not by the optimisation of a device's function, but by the apt fulfilment of users' epistemic aims.
.

Jiarui Qu
Selecting the criteria of model selection
NYU · jq603@nyu.edu
How should scientists select among rival statistical models? I generalize mathematical results showing that attractive epistemic desiderata for model-selection criteria—— statistical consistency and statistical efficiency—are incompatible. Statisticians typically understand these results as suggesting an incompatibility between approximating truth or predictive success. Furthermore, Sober and Otsuka argue for an instrumentalist perspective under which model selection aims at predictive success. I criticize typical interpretations of the incompatibility results and Sober and Otsuka's instrumentalism. Instead, I propose a novel strategy for choosing between kinds of model-selection criteria.

Jinwoo Heo
Against Beliefless Knowledge
Seoul National University · thomas703@snu.ac.kr
Most epistemologists accept the thesis that knowledge entails belief. However, some philosophers argue that there are cases where a subject knows a proposition without believing it, and therefore the thesis is false. In this paper, I propose a strategy for addressing such putative counterexamples. My strategy is to appeal to KNA-Suff, according to which if one knows that p, then it is proper for one to assert p. Importantly, the subject in question cannot properly assert the relevant proposition, and therefore the cases fail to constitute genuine counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge entails belief.

Jitai Zhang
Standpoint epistemology without Relativism: social-situated agent involved in cognitive processing

Free University of Berlin · tojitaizhang@gmail.com
Standpoint epistemology claims that knowledge is shaped by social position, but faces a dilemma: standpoint differences seem either to threaten objectivity or to collapse into relativism. This paper reframes the problem through comparator models of cognitive processing. Agents know by acting in the world, generating expectations, and testing them against environmental feedback. Social standpoints shape these expectations and thus the object–context complexes agents engage. Apparent disagreement may therefore reflect different situated cognitive trajectories rather than incompatible contents. Objectivity is preserved because feedback constrains success.

Joel Yalland
Epistemic Goods and the Repugnant Conclusion
University of Kent · j.yalland@kent.ac.uk
The *Repugnant Conclusion* prompts the fundamental question of whether more of some good is a necessarily desirable outcome and generally emphasizes welfare, resources, and quality of life. While there are existing accounts of epistemic parallels that emphasize credal accuracy, I think they might be slightly limited. I'm interested in whether maximising epistemic goods like *understanding*, *inquiry*, and *intellectual virtue* generate similarly repugnant conclusions, or whether such conclusions become more salient given epistemic injustice, misinformation, and censorship. I will present both Derek Parfit's account of the Repugnant Conclusion and the current epistemic parallels, before proposing my own potential cases.

Jordan Scott
Knowledge, Success, and the Epistemic Method
University of Oxford · jordan.scott@univ.ox.ac.uk
As performance-epistemologists have highlighted, theories of knowledge face a right-kind-of-way problem similar to those in the philosophy of action. Recent accounts of intentional action deal with the problem by appealing to action-plans, claiming successful, non-deviant action must cohere with the action's governing plan. This paper uses a similar framework to advance a novel theory of knowledge. It jettisons conditions of competence, virtue, safety, or aptness, in favour of a minimalist view on which knowledge comes merely from an epistemic action that achieves its aim in line with its method.

Jorren Dykstra
— An Excuse for Excuses —
University of St Andrews · jd259@st-andrews.ac.uk
According to Williamson and Littlejohn, mistakes of fact can only ever be excused – arbitrarily well excused, but excused no less. In the best case, an excuse defrays criticism, both hot (blame, anger) and cold (distrust, suspicion), without providing a defence against the wrong alleged. But this is not possible: when one does something wrong, or is in the wrong, one manifests a kind of defect of character or will; for this reason, it makes sense to blame or distrust them (Strawson, countless others). In defending this claim, I confront Lasonen's recent attempt to detach wrongdoing and fault.

João Fett
Unjustified Defeaters and the Role of Incoherence in Epistemic Defeat
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) - Brazil · joao.fett@pucrs.br
This paper examines the possibility of unjustified defeaters and the explanatory role of incoherence in epistemic defeat. Focusing on Peter Graham and Jack Lyons's objections to Jennifer Lackey's account of psychological defeaters, I argue that rejecting unjustified defeaters yields implausible verdicts about rationality in cases involving incoherent belief sets. I further contend that incoherence is essential for explaining the irrationality produced by such defeaters, even when a subject's total evidence remains

unchanged. Against evidentialist accounts that locate defeat in loss of propositional justification, I conclude that incoherence is indispensable to understanding epistemic defeat.

Julia Staffel
The Planning Fallacy and the Agent's Perspective
University of Colorado Boulder · julia.staffel@colorado.edu
People often resolve to do difficult things, despite having evidence that they might fail. This presents a puzzle: How can these resolutions be rational and sincere, given the evidence of likely failure? Adding to the puzzle, studies have shown that people are overly optimistic about their own success while offering realistic assessments of other people's prospects. Research on the planning fallacy, maintaining evidentialist commitments, argues that people's overconfidence in their own success prospects is irrational. By contrast, some philosophers claim that agents must divorce practical from evidential reasoning, allowing them to rationally and sincerely intend difficult actions despite the evidence. I argue for an empirically informed, evidentialist account of how agents can rationally and sincerely resolve to do difficult actions. By forming the right kinds of implementation intentions, agents can raise their probability of success in many cases. Further, the view explains how the observed self-other asymmetry can be rational.

Julian Ratcliffe
Irrelevant Influences and Contingent Belief
University of Oxford · julian@endeva.co.za
Genealogical anxiety is the anxiety that the contingent causal origins of our representations undermine their rational standing. Yet while many of our representations' causal origins are contingent, the terms are not synonymous. So what is doing the philosophical work: the fact that our beliefs have *causal* origins or that they are *contingent*? I argue that this ambiguity characterises an underappreciated distinction between two accounts of genealogy. I then show that both hinge on distinct conceptions of epistemic reliability. Finally, I argue that both accounts flatten genealogy's significance and obscure what makes it philosophically interesting: its destabilisation of the knower herself.

Julio Pérez García
From Epistēmē to 'Knowledge': Why Gettier Epistemology Chased an Unattainable Ideal.
Complutense University of Madrid · juliop03@ucm.es
Why are Gettier cases taken as refutations, and why did the project they inaugurated prove impossible to complete? Both questions share one answer: Gettier epistemology combines a fallibilist conception of knowledge; an attributional methodology governed by case-intuitions; infallibilist expectations inherited from the classical tradition; and the traditional aspiration to a closed, exhaustive definition. Tracing epistēmē's transition to 'knowledge' and the mismatch from Plato's jury to Malcolm's engagement with Prichard, I show how this configuration arose and why its commitments are incompatible, rendering the project incoherent. Most post-Gettier approaches inherit these difficulties.

Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss
Epistemic normativity?
Stockholm University · kathrin.gluer-pagin@philosophy.su.se · asa.wikforss@philosophy.su.
The paper addresses the question whether there are epistemic norms and, if so, what their nature is. We argue against the idea that reasons, rationality and justification are inherently normative. The only norms that can be properly described as epistemic, we suggest, are norms of investigation, so called zetetic norms. This, we suggest, provides an answer to the worry that zetetic norms may come into conflict with other epistemic norms: no such normative conflict will arise if the only epistemic norms are zetetic. Moreover, we argue, since zetetic norms are purely instrumental norms they are not genuinely prescriptive. They concern the means required to reach a certain epistemic goal, such as truth or knowledge. The impression of genuine prescriptivity, we suggest, derives from the idea that we have moral obligations to engage in investigation, especially when it comes to beliefs that affect other people (such as beliefs about the climate or vaccines).

Katie Moody
Testimonial Framing
University of Oxford · kate.moody@trinity.ox.ac.uk
Metaphor is ubiquitous in communication, and we use it in the service of many epistemic ends: to explain, to persuade, to describe. This raises a question: what is the relationship between metaphor and its epistemic effects? I consider and reject one thesis: that we use metaphor to make assertions, and so hearers can gain testimonial knowledge on this basis. Instead, I argue that we should think of the relationship between metaphor and its epistemic effects not in terms of assertion but rather in terms of framing. I combine this with research on the relationship between metaphors and models in the philosophy of science to sketch a solution.

Kelsey Wengert
The Case for Heeding Misleading Evidence
University of Southern California · kwengert@usc.edu
Several dogmatism puzzles rely on the principle Entitlement: If one knows that a piece of evidence is misleading, one is entitled to disregard it. In this talk, I argue that Entitlement is false. After an examination of what it means for evidence to be misleading, and what it means to disregard evidence, I argue that any view allowing one to know that a piece of evidence is misleading should embrace a surprising conclusion: one ought to heed such misleading evidence nonetheless. I suggest that this result is not as bad as it seems.

Ken Howarth
Judgment, Adequacy, and Epistemic Governance
Mercer County Community College · howarthk@mccc.edu
This paper argues that responsible action depends not on maximizing epistemic standing but on meeting context-sensitive thresholds for proceeding, pausing, relying, or escalating under uncertainty. Such thresholds require integrative judgment rather than evidential assessment alone. Adequacy is proposed as a central normative category for epistemic governance, showing how institutions should be evaluated not only by the information they produce but by the quality of judgment they form, preserve, and distribute.

Krisztian Kos
Exploring Attributions of Affective States: The Affective Picture
University of Cambridge · kbk26@cam.ac.uk
A crucial part of how we understand the mental lives and actions of other people are our attributions of affective states. These belong to the recently termed “affective stance”: to adopt the affective stance is to ascribe affective states to others. However, there is no consensus about what is required of a subject to perform ascriptions of affective states, and to do so accurately. In this paper, I argue that there is a perspective, which I term the "affective picture", that subjects must employ to gain the epistemic access to other's affective lives required for adopting the affective stance.

Kunimasa Sato
Narrative Injustice
Ibaraki University · miamikunickham@gmail.com
I propose narrative injustice as a form of epistemic injustice that dismisses narrative testimony. First, I critique recent studies of narratives and knowledge about what experiences are like, referred to as “what-it-is-like” knowledge, to demonstrate that narrative testimony characteristically transmits narrators’ what-it-is-like knowledge in the

propositional form, and can bestow the ability to imagine what similar experiences would be like. Next, I argue that narrative injustice applies to listeners who adopt dismissive interrogative attitudes toward what narrators' target experiences were like. Third, I characterize narrative injustice as a subcategory of Fricker's epistemic injustice.

Kyle van Oosterum
From Passive Subjects to Active Epistemic Agents: Non-Ideal Epistemology and Community Notes
King's College London · kyle.van_oosterum@kcl.ac.uk
Civic mistrust and misinformation are standardly met with top-down fact-checking, but such approaches engage citizens' epistemic agency only passively, presenting them with facts to believe while leaving them out of the work of validating and disseminating those facts. We argue for promoting active epistemic agency instead. This matters in two ways. Instrumentally, actively engaged agents jointly steward their epistemic commons, yielding a more resilient social landscape than top-down alternatives. Normatively, institutions that render agents passive fail to respect them as rational, self-governing beings. We conclude by suggesting one promising institutional realization of this ideal.

Lara Maassen
Rational Agency in Gaslighting
University of St Andrews · lnm3@st-andrews.ac.uk
This talk argues that knowers can retain rational agency upon being gaslit. Much of the scholarship seems to deny this possibility, arguing that gaslighting 'destroy[s] another person's standing to issue challenges'. Since this view raises both descriptive and normative issues, my aim is to correct this account. By framing gaslighting as a form of misrepresented disagreement, I suggest that gaslighting can be (1) local rather than global, and (2) exploitative rather than destructive. I argue: insofar as gaslighting is local and exploitative—which it paradigmatically is—then victims can retain rational agency upon being gaslit.

Lilith Mace
Against Doxastic Reduction Accounts of Doubt
University of Glasgow · lilith.mace@glasgow.ac.uk
In recent years, several philosophers have offered *doxastic reduction* accounts of doubt, on which doubt is reduced to another doxastic attitude: belief, credence, or suspension. In this talk, I argue that extant doxastic reduction accounts fail to account for the normative profile of doubt and the fact that doubt comes in degrees, so are, at least, in need of further refinement.

Liran Dror
Tension Between the Epistemic and the Zetetic: The Bias Avoidance Norm of Inquiry
The University of St Andrews · ld267@st-andrews.ac.uk
This paper asks whether zetetic norms are in tension with traditional epistemic norms by first setting out Friedman's 2020 argument for tension. Friedman's argument is shown to suffer from the limitation that the zetetic instrumental principle is better understood as a practical norm. An alternative bias avoidance norm of inquiry (BANI) is developed and shown to be a better candidate for a truly epistemic norm of inquiry which generates tension with traditional epistemic norms. Two limitations of this norm concerning its moral/practical nature and what it demands of agents are reviewed and ultimately dismissed.

Lizzie Fricker
Can Understanding be Possessed at Second-Hand?
University of Oxford · lizzie.fricker@magd.oxford.ac.uk

It is uncontroversial that knowledge that P can be transmitted from a source-agent S to a recipient R via testimony, and that when R knows that P on this basis, her knowledge is second-hand, and she has epistemic dependence on its source S. In contrast, many philosophers deny that understanding of some item X can be similarly transmitted, and then possessed on the basis of epistemic deference to the transmitting source. I develop an account of transmission. I distinguish strict from non-strict transmission, and then explore whether understanding of some item X can ever be transmitted, and held on the basis of epistemic deference to the source. I find that practical understanding of how to do some task can often be non-strictly transmitted, and possessed on the basis of deference to the source. But that, if we accept a strong intuition about such matters, intellectual understanding cannot be so transmitted and possessed.

Lola M. Vizuete and Dani Pino
Understanding Hermeneutical Injustice: A Practices-First Approach

Lou Thomine
An amendment to Lackey's Wide Norm of credibility
University of Cologne · louthomine@gmail.com
This paper raises a puzzle for the Wide Norm of credibility in testimonial exchanges. I argue that the norm is too weak, for it fails to tackle the necessary condition of testimonial injustice, namely, the explanatory connection between a prejudice and a credibility judgment. By only requiring the hearer to match the evidence, the Wide Norm is compatible with cases in which a hearer does match such evidence yet bases her credibility judgment on prejudice. I then strengthen the Wide Norm in a way that embeds the need for an explanatory connection between the credibility and the evidence, making it resistant to such problematic cases.

Maciej Tarnowski
Belief as an epistemic possibility of knowledge (and its limits)1
Jagiellonian University · maciej.tarnowski@uj.edu.pl
Some epistemologists have proposed identifying belief with the epistemic possibility of knowledge as part of the knowledge-first project of explicating various concepts in terms of knowledge. This view is commonly thought to entail controversial, internalist principles such as KK and BK. We challenge this assumption by presenting a minimal epistemic logic in which this reductive thesis holds without implying either principle. We show that the resulting notion of belief preserves important structural and normative features while allowing to express externalist epistemic intuitions.

Manuel Liz
Hyperintensional Machines, Aptness, and the Epistemic Sources of Intensionality
Universidad de La Laguna · manuliz@gmail.com
Frege's distinction between sense and reference introduced intensionality, while hyperintensionality (HI) distinguishes between necessarily equivalent contents. Yet the source and significance of HI remain controversial. This paper addresses the issue through a thought experiment involving a machine that emulates our best cognitive and evaluative performances. The experiment suggests that HI is neither a cognitive defect, a purely ontological feature, nor a merely conceptual phenomenon, but a structural feature of epistemic agency. Grounding epistemic agency in Sosa's virtue framework can clarify the individuation of HI distinctions and their semantic and metaphysical significance.

Marc Lara Crosas
Better Normic Than Safe
University of Barcelona · mlaracro49@alumnes.ub.edu

Abstract not provided.

Marcelo Cabral
A Defense of Weak Epistemic Individualism
UNICAMP · marcelobc87@gmail.com
This paper defends a diachronic form of epistemic individualism. Much contemporary work attempts to shift justificatory force away from the individual and anchor it in broader social structures. I argue that these strategies do not eliminate the believer's role. Examining cases of heavy epistemic dependence, I show that a believer's cognitive involvement remains a necessary condition for distinguishing genuine justification from mere epistemic luck.

Mariona Miyata-Sturm
Aesthetic theoretical virtues will not help you gain nonfactive understanding
University of Glasgow · mariona.miyata-sturm@glasgow.ac.uk
Recently, several philosophers have argued that aesthetic theoretical virtues, such as a theory's beauty and elegance, are conducive to understanding not truth. This is supposed to explain why aesthetic virtues can be epistemically useful without claiming that a beautiful theory is thereby more likely to be true. I argue that this project fails. Insofar as aesthetic virtues contribute to science, it helps to get things right. I discuss two prominent strategies for arguing that understanding is nonfactive and argue that neither provide the desired alternative to truth-conduciveness.

Martin Smith
Probability, Normalcy and the Ethics of Risk
University of Edinburgh · martin.smith@ed.ac.uk
As a number of arguments attest, moral theories that posit absolute prohibitions - like an absolute prohibition on sacrificing a life in order to secure a quantity of small benefits - seem to have difficulty in dealing with the ethics of *risk*. While these arguments are often used to undermine the idea of absolute prohibitions, I think they carry a different lesson; there is something unduly restrictive about the way in which we conventionally approach the ethics of risk. In this paper, I distinguish two different ways in which to measure the size and ethical significance of a risk - one based on probability (the conventional approach), and one based on normalcy.

Masashi Kasaki & Shun Tsugita
The Prompt-Responsive View of AI Testimonial Warrant
Nagoya University · kasaki.nu@gmail.com / Toyama University · stsugita@hmt.u-toyama.ac.jp
As conversational AIs become common information-seeking tools, an epistemological question arises: how can users acquire warranted beliefs in AI outputs? In addressing this question, we offer a novel "prompt-responsive view" of AI testimonial warrant, modeled on the trust-responsive view of human testimonial warrant. Because conversational AIs are designed to value user input, prompts function like trust signals—effective prompts motivate AIs to generate true outputs, while poor prompts yield fabrications and other errors. Thus, warrant arises from the non-accidental link between effective prompts and true outputs.

Matt Jope
Credit and Blame for Generative AI Use
University of Glasgow · matthew.jope@glasgow.ac.uk
Recent work on responsibility for gen-AI use presents a credit-blame asymmetry: users may be blamed for harmful AI-generated outputs but not creditworthy for beneficial outputs produced with minimal skill or effort. We argue that this asymmetry involves a double conflation of both different act types and different norm types. Blame in the

relevant cases is distinctively moral, while the relevant notion of credit is epistemic or telic. Once restricted to a single act-types and norm-types, the asymmetry disappears. While negligent reliance is morally blameworthy regardless of outcome, non-negligent, competent reliance can constitute genuine, creditworthy, and even meta-apt achievements.

Matt McGrath
Epistemic and Zetetic Conflicts
Washington University St. Louis · matthew.m@wustl.edu
I consider the question of whether traditional epistemic norms conflict with zetetic norms, and if they do how best to understand and react to the conflict. After considering recent proposals from Friedman, Thorstad and Kahn, I suggest that reflection on the issue of the epistemic significance of what we “should have known” points us toward a plausible view of these matters, too.

Matthew Vermaire
Practical Zetetics
University of St Andrews · mav9@st-andrews.ac.uk
Philosophical work on inquiry has been concerned overwhelmingly with inquiry into theoretical questions, questions ofwhat is the case. I draw attention, though, to the parallel phenomenon of practical inquiry, which is connected instead to practical questions of what to do. I begin the project of theorizing practical inquiry and its components, including practical interrogative attitudes, a constitutive aim at correct intention, and a distinctive set of zetetic norms. I also explore the significance of practical inquiry for metaethical considerations of reasons for action and belief and for the status of the zetetic turn in epistemology.

Michael Hannon
Believing in Philosophy
University of Nottingham · mhannon09@gmail.com
Peer disagreement in philosophy is widespread and persistent. This has led some to conclude that philosophers are not justified in believing their own theories. In response to this skeptical challenge, many theorists have proposed alternative attitudes—such as speculation, acceptance, or endorsement—that allow one to ‘have a view’ without believing it. I argue that these belief-substitutes are inadequate. Instead of replacing belief with some other attitude, I defend a permissivist metaphilosophy that justifies belief even in the face of peer disagreement. This framework also reorients how we understand both disagreement and progress in philosophy.

Michel Croce
Epistemic Authority and AI Systems
University of Genoa · michel.croce@unige.it
This paper defends an invariance thesis: if I have reason to endorse preemption views (PV) or total evidence views (TEV) of epistemic authority for human sources, no AI-specific consideration justifies an exception. I challenge two convergent positions. TEV proponents (Boisseau, Hauswald, Lange) take AI opacity and algorithmic curation to favour TEV in the AI case; I show these are calibration problems, not normative ones. PV proponents (Grundmann) restrict preemption to sources whose reason-responsiveness presupposes agency. I argue this restriction is inherited, not derived, from PV, and defend a functionalist reading of reason-responsiveness that extends to AI systems.

Mikael Janvid

How the Debasing Demon Helped the Tortoise
Stockholm University · mikael.janvid@philosophy.su.se
This paper targets a new theory of basing developed by Lisa Miracchi Titus and J. Adam Carter which they also claim solve Carroll's paradox. Even granted they avoid the problems other accounts are faced with, they still offer another victim to the Debasing Demon. This Demon debases all beliefs of its victims so that they lack doxastic justification. Never knowing whether proper basing occurs is an unwelcome result for Titus and Carter's theory on account of its internalist commitments. This skeptical scenario also enables the Tortoise to remain in its predicament of not letting it be persuaded by Achilles.

Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp
Artificial Epistemic Agency
University of Oxford / University of Birmingham · mona.simion@philosophy.ox.ac.uk / c.kelp@bham.ac.uk
Can AIs be genuine epistemic agents? Can they know things? Do they base their outputs on evidence? Are they genuine inquirers? Are their outputs informative speech acts? In this talk we defend optimism about artificial epistemic agency: we argue that epistemic agency emerges on the spectrum of functional normativity, and that we have overwhelming evidence to believe (some) Large Language Models instantiate justification, norm-governed inquiry, and informative speech.

Murali Ramachandran
The Surprise Exam and the Surprise-Dependence Block
University of Witwatersrand · presupposed@gmail.com
Variations of the surprise exam paradox have students being informed: (En) that they will have an exam within the next n days, but (S) that they will not know which day until they get it. However, once students are so apprised, it would seem to follow that (CRUXn) if the exam is given on the last day, dayn, the students will know on dayn−1 that the exam will be given on dayn, contra (S). So, the students can apparently deduce, and thereby come to know, (En−1) that they will have an exam within the next n−1 days . . . and it appears we have the beginnings of a regress leading to the paradoxical conclusion that
the threatened 'surprise' exam cannot be given at all. We shall argue, developing a neglected insight from Doris Olin, that if there is an n where (CRUXn) is instrumental in the students coming to know an existence premise (En−1): (a) that knowledge depends on (S) being true, and, consequently, (b) (CRUXn−1) cannot be legitimately used to derive the next rung of the regress, (En−2). So, all variations of the surprise exam underpinned by the recursive use of (CRUXk) are thereby blocked.

Nastasia Mueller
Trust as Mechanism: Rethinking Rational Trust and Its Application to AI
Technische Universität Berlin · mullernastasia@gmail.com
Can it be rational to trust artificial intelligence even if AI lacks trustworthiness? I argue that it can. Against doxastic accounts, I defend a dispositional account of trust shaped by underlying cognitive, affective, and social mechanisms, rather than by beliefs about another agent's trustworthiness. I distinguish three forms of rational trust: epistemic, practical, and entitlement-based. Applying this framework to AI and LLMs, I argue that "fake testimony" can engage testimonial trust mechanisms and trigger trust dispositions. Trust in AI can therefore be rational without presupposing trustworthiness, though whether we should trust AI remains a separate normative question.

Nicholas Shackel
Stakes and Full Belief.
Cardiff University · n.shackel@gmail.com
Many cases used to motivate contextualism are ones in which an achieved epistemic standard, of the kind that can make the difference between true belief and knowledge, is held constant whilst stakes are varied. It seems to us that when stakes are low we know and when stakes are high we don't, and on this basis contextualists argue for

contextualism about knowledge. Invariantists of a non-skeptical bent who grant the truth of our intuitions need to explain them away. In this paper I advance the full belief explanation of this change of knowledge whilst retaining both invariantism and intellectualism.

Ofra Magidor
The Myth of the De Se Revisited.
University of Oxford · ofra.magidor@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
According to de se exceptionalists there is a special class of propositional attitudes, ones that we typically report using indexicals ('I believe that **I** am making a mess', 'I desire the meeting to end **now**'), and these pose a special challenge to our theories of propositions and propositional attitudes, requiring us to revise otherwise adequate theories thereof. According to de se sceptics (Cappelen & Dever 2013, Magidor 2015), de se exceptionalism is a myth. In the last decade, de se exceptionalists have published multiple responses to the sceptical challenge. By and large, these are concessive to the objections originally raised by de se sceptics, but maintain that the sceptics failed to correctly identify what the distinctive challenge posed by de se attitudes really is. In this talk, I discuss some of these newer attempts to defend exceptionalism and argue that they do not succeed in defending the view.

Pablo Zendejas Medina
Knowledge and the Inquisitive Inquirer
University of Helsinki · zendejas.pablo@gmail.com
Does the pursuit of knowledge always justify inquiry? The defeasibility of knowledge raises the worry that inquirers should sometimes dogmatically refrain from investigating in order to protect the knowledge they already have. I'll argue that the deepest tension arises in cases where evidence defeats knowledge while leaving rational belief intact. If such cases are impossible, there's a compelling explanation of why inquiry can be rational despite the risk of losing knowledge.

Patric Harting
Knowledge-Likeness: A Framework for Epistemic Progress
Lingnan University · patrichagenharting@ln.hk
While science apparently progresses, epistemological challenges suggest that empirical knowledge is difficult to acquire. In this paper I reconcile that tension by introducing the concept of knowledge-likeness, which measures how closely a claim resembles actual knowledge. Grounded in a Justified True Belief framework, knowledge-likeness relates to the alignments between truth, justification and belief. This framework allows for real epistemic progress even without absolute certainty. Finally, I argue that the concept can be used to defend scientific realism against anti-realist critiques by framing knowledge not as a static binary state, but as a dynamic, multi-dimensional achievement.

Paul Faulkner
It's OK to Believe AI Chatbots
University of Sheffield · paul.faulkner@sheffield.ac.uk
Are we justified in believing what AI chatbots tell us? This talk investigates whether this question can be answered through the application of a non-reductive epistemological theory of testimony. If this theory applies to AI chatbot testimony, then we are justified in believing what AI chatbots tells us, other things being equal. The talk argues that it is possible to apply non-reductive theory here, and it seeks to identify the challenges of doing so.

Paulo Pirozelli
Epistemic Iteration as a Reinforcement Learning Process

University of São Paulo · ppirozelli@usp.br
Chang defines epistemic iteration as a cumulative process in which successive stages of knowledge enhance certain epistemic goals. It remains unclear, however, under what conditions such a process yields increasingly reliable knowledge. We argue that reinforcement learning (RL)—an AI paradigm centered on iterative self-improvement—offers a framework for articulating these conditions, involving temporal structure, convergence to a fixed point, and internal criteria of stabilization. We further discuss how actor–critic architectures illuminate Chang's problem of nomic measurement. Thus, RL emerges as a framework for specifying when epistemic iteration leads to progressively reliable knowledge.

Piotr Litwin
The Needle in a Haystack is Still Shiny. Relevant Alternatives and Failures of Epistemic Deference
Doctoral School in the Humanities, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland · piotr.litwin@doctoral.uj.edu.pl
Blake-Turner (2020) argues that fake news threatens knowledge by presenting people with relevant alternatives they are not in a position to rule out. Drawing on Dretske and Lewis while incorporating insights from social epistemology, I argue that being in a position to rule out is rare for laypeople. It requires not only evidence, but domain-specific competence. Identifying and excluding alternatives is primarily the role of experts. Laypeople instead can develop a distinct epistemic competence: recognizing when salient alternatives should be dismissed as irrelevant. Fake news undermines knowledge by encouraging treatment of pseudo-alternatives as epistemically on par with expert judgement

Rayan Geha
The structure of objectual understanding
Sorbonne Université · rayangeha@gmail.com
The standard account of objectual understanding characterizes its object as a subject matter, granting it an unrestricted scope. However, this unrestricted scope contradicts the account's other core commitments: factivity and grasping. Factivity cannot accommodate our genuine understanding of false theories or fictions. And the grasping requirement fails because not all subject matters possess a coherent internal architecture. To resolve these tensions, I propose a restriction on the scope of understanding. Drawing on Moravcsik (1979), I argue we must shift the object of understanding from subject matters to closed structures, a redefinition that dissolves both contradictions.

Rebecca Bailey
The Distinction Between True Beliefs and Getting Things Right: Reevaluating the Aim of Belief
University of Colorado-Boulder · rebecca.bailey@colorado.edu
All philosophers who define doxastic correctness as an alethic epistemic norm accept that it is correct to believe P if and only if P is true. This is often defended via the claim that a subject has “gotten things right” about the true P when they believe P. In this paper, I’ll argue that true belief and getting things right come apart by introducing non-classical truth values into the mix: There can be cases in which a subject believes the true P, but fails to get things right about P when P is also false.

Regina Hurley
Who Should Doctors Doubt?: Managing Doubt Amid Diagnostic Uncertainty
University at Buffalo · rhurley3@buffalo.edu
Some health conditions are difficult to diagnose. When diagnostic inquiry fails to converge on a diagnosis, physicians sometimes doubt the veracity of patients’ testimony. This paper argues that such doubt is justified only after relevant alternative explanations for the diagnostic uncertainty have been adequately considered. I develop a relevant alternatives framework centered on diagnostic range (DR)—the range of diagnoses a physician can reliably make—and argue that DR-sensitivity, the ability to recognize when a condition likely falls outside one’s DR, is a professional epistemic obligation. The paper is a corrective to views reducing these errors to testimonial injustice.

Rhys Borchert
A Centrist Epistemology
University of Greifswald · rhys.borchert@uni-greifswald.de
I defend an account of perceptual justification that incorporates a broadly Fodorian account of cognitive architecture.

Roman Heil
Nobody Cares? Collective Instrumentalism, Trivial Beliefs and the Balance of Epistemic Interests
Goethe University Frankfurt · r.heil@em.uni-frankfurt.de
While collective epistemic instrumentalism promises to explain the categoricity of epistemic normativity, it struggles to explain why individual believers have reason to comply with epistemic norms. In my talk, I will argue that epistemic norms are grounded in a proportional balancing of individual and collective epistemic goals. The resulting view — Proportional Instrumentalism_E (PIE) — allows instrumentalists to have their cake and eat it too: PIE provides categorical epistemic norms and shows that individual believers have reason to comply with them. I also argue that PIE offers a novel treatment of the recalcitrant problem of trivial beliefs (Harman, 1986).

Rory Aird
LLMs aren't safe
American University of Armenia · roryairdphilosophy@gmail.com
In this paper, I argue that large language models (LLMs) are not safe---in the modal sense famous from analyses of knowledge. More precisely, I propose that, due to the aleatoric uncertainty playing a constitutive role in LLM system architecture, beliefs based on their outputs are akin to beliefs about losing fair lotteries familiar from epistemology---the possibility of error is modally close enough (even if probabilistically distant) to be knowledge-undermining. Thus, one does not---and possibly cannot---get knowledge from inquiries to LLMs.

Ross Patrizio
Gricean maxims as epistemic norms
IUSS Pavia · RFPATRIZIO@GMAIL.COM
Standard approaches to the normativity of assertion draw a sharp line between epistemic norms—governing truth, knowledge, and evidential support—and pragmatic norms—governing relevance, clarity, and manner. This article challenges that picture. Using Grice's maxims as a canonical articulation of the epistemology/pragmatics divide, I argue that familiar resources for theorising about the epistemic normativity of assertion extend equally to all Gricean maxims, not just Quality, as is standardly assumed. The upshot is significant: the boundary between epistemology and pragmatics must be reconsidered; the two domains are more tightly intertwined than has been assumed.

Sang-Ick Kim
Irrefutable Gettier's Closure Principle and The Lottery Paradox
University of Nebraska-Lincoln · skim42@huskers.unl.edu
This paper argues that the analogy between the Closure Principle in the Lottery Paradox (CPL) and Gettier's Closure Principle (GCP) will strengthen a view: denying the Lockean thesis resolves the Lottery Paradox.
This paper focuses on GCP rather than the Gettier problem. Gettier utilizes GCP to connect the true beliefs and the justification, but GCP is unnecessary for establishing the Gettier Problem.

I will show another usage of GCP. In the Lottery Paradox, once we accept the irrefutability of CPL from the analogy with GCP, the only available option is denying the Lockean thesis.

Satsuki Inoue
The Intellectualist Theory of Know How and the Theory of Facts and Propositions
Chiba University · satsukiinoue2@gmail.com
There is an assumption shared by intellectualists and even by some anti-intellectualists: knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that through the semantics of embedded questions (Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011; Carter and Pritchard 2015). This assumption has faced many challenges. Although many solutions have been proposed, there is still no general agreement. In this talk, we aim to shed new light on this debate by introducing Schaffer's proposal concerning wh-knowledge, which addresses the problem of embedded questions (Schaffer 2007, 2009). We then examine the consequences of this proposal and suggest a new direction for research in this area.

Sebastian Horvat
Logical Truth and Perception
University of Vienna · sebastian.horvat@univie.ac.at
Is there a sense in which empirical instances or counter-instances of logical truths can be perceived? I will address this question by: (i) distinguishing perceiving-that-"something is the case" from other perceptual activities, (ii) providing some conditions under which certain logically complex propositions can be objects of perceiving-that, but (iii) arguing that these conditions imply that neither instances nor counter-instances of some familiar logical truths can be objects of perceiving-that. This conclusion, together with the reason for why it holds, partly illuminates the arguably puzzling conjunction of empirical applicability and apparent empirical unrevisability of logical truths.

Simon Wimmer
Is Objectual Knowledge Just Factual Knowledge?
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf · simon.wimmer@hhu.de
Is there an epistemic relation of objectual knowledge in addition to that of factual knowledge? The Oxford Realists Cook Wilson and Robinson argue that there is not. They respond to four arguments meant to distinguish objectual knowledge from factual knowledge. Cook Wilson rejects three, and Robinson fillls a gap in Cook Wilson's discussion by rejecting the fourth. I focus on Robinson's response to what I call the argument from knowledge ascriptions. This allows me to showcase a view of objectual knowledge rarely explored in contemporary epistemology and to flesh out how Oxford Realists understood their central theoretical primitive, i.e. knowledge.

Somayeh Tohidi
Rational Resistance to Correction: A Bayesian Analysis of the Continued Influence Effect
University of Bristol · somayeh.tohidi@bristol.ac.uk
The continued influence effect is the well-documented tendency of misinformation to shape belief even after it has been corrected and the correction accepted. Standard explanations blame the receiver: faulty memory, motivated reasoning, cognitive limitation. I argue that the effect can arise for an ideally rational Bayesian agent, from the structure of the information environment rather than any failure of reasoning. Modelling both misinformation and correction as testimony from partially trusted sources, I show that a correction trusted more than the misinformation still need not undo it, and that resistance to institutional corrections can be rational rather than a lapse.

Sophia Arbeiter

Anti-Luminosity and Detectivism
Bielefeld University · sophia.arbeiter@uni-bielefeld.de
Anti-Luminosity and Detectivism: I argue that the Anti-Luminosity argument is more limited in scope than commonly assumed: the reason-sensitive attitudes (at least belief, intention to act and motivated desire) are exempt from it. This is because I show that Williamson's and Srinivasan's motivations for the crucial margin-for-error premise proceed on detectivist assumptions about self-knowledge, which are false for the reason-sensitive attitudes. I conclude by responding to two objections to this argument: first, that the Anti-Luminosity argument surely applies to a gradual notion of confidence, second, that the self-knowledge I advocate for does not merit to be called "knowledge".

Sophie Keeling
Authority of Marginalisation and the Performing Arts
UNED · sophie.keeling@fsof.uned.es
Marginalised groups seem to possess a degree of authority regarding that marginalisation. For example, to learn more about conditions for women in a workplace, intuitively one should ask a woman. And yet this authority cannot be automatic; they also face a number of hurdles to understanding their position. To give one example, marginalised groups frequently lack theoretical resources, or at least widely recognised resources, with which to understand their experiences. This paper will highlight a number of ways in which questions concerning this authority can be elucidated by reflection on the performing arts.

Sorin Moisescu
Self-Knowledge and Second-Order Knowledge by the Lens of Sensation
University of Bucharest Faculty of Philosophy · moisescusorin@gmail.com
The position that it is an essential feature of pain to be felt as pain is still fairly controversial. I will present a more radical version of the 'constitutive' view, namely that 'I have a headache', 'I believe I have a headache' and, most notably, 'I know I have a headache' are identical states.
Pain is a case of self-knowledge where first-person authority gets the throne, and seems to evade Evan's puzzle of transparency. I will argue against the empiricist account of self-knowledge (Alex Byrne's) in favour of a rationalist-agentialist account and, via Reid, for a modal-doxastic view of sensation.

Sukhvinder Shahi
Novelty and Contrastive Know How
University of Arizona · sshahi@arizona.edu
This paper argues that knowledge-how is marked by the capacity to act successfully in novel circumstances. It distinguishes two kinds of novelty: variability, or adapting to changing external conditions, and robustness, or recombining elements of performance in new ways. While anti-intellectualist objections show limits in narrow propositional accounts, they do not defeat intellectualism generally if propositions are understood as generative. Still, Stanley and Williamson's semantic intellectualism fails to explain the cognitive nature of practical knowledge. The paper proposes a contrastivist account: know-how involves sensitivity to relevant alternatives and error possibilities.

Suprotik Chakrabarti
Two responses to Modal Virtue Epistemology
Azim Premji University · suprotik@gmail.com
Beddor and Pavese propose Modal Virtue Epistemology (MVE) as a synthesis of two major traditions in epistemology: the modal account and the virtue-epistemological account. I wish to make two points against that. The first one is regarding how they deal with exceptional performances — where there is clear display of skill but at the same time the performance is modally weak. Secondly, I argue that MVE's normality-indexed safety condition presupposes a non-modal, aptness-like notion to do its core work.

Swithin Thomas
Two presuppositions of hinge epistemology
Central European University · swithinthomas@gmail.com
Hinge epistemology, the philosophical program based on Wittgenstein's last writings, rests on two presuppositions. Exegetically, it assumes that Wittgenstein is centrally engaged with the problem of scepticism. Philosophically, it assumes that the special status of being a "hinge" is had by some set of propositions, leading to disagreement as to what to count as a hinge. I argue that both these presuppositions are mistaken and suggest an alternative view of the problem that On Certainty is concerned with and the philosophical significance of the certainties Wittgenstein discusses.

Tammo Lossau
(Politically) Radical Skepticism: An approach from Zhuangzi
University of Bremen · lossau1@uni-bremen.de
There has been an allegation - particularly in Jonathan Ichikawa's book "Epistemic Courage" - that philosophical skepticism leads to a conservative or at least apolitical form of behavior. I argue that a different conceptualization of skepticism is available that draws from Zhuangzi and centers on natural and spontaneous behavior. As this form of skepticism is motivated by the idea that everyone has their natural perspective, it leads to a form of tolerance. Moreover, if we find compassion in our nature, we can be motivated to promote a free and unbounded society.

Tatiana Sitnikova
Bullshit Inquiry
University of Cambridge · ts884@cam.ac.uk
This paper identifies bullshit inquiries: inquiries that appear legitimate, while systematically evading genuine truth-seeking. Drawing on Frankfurt (1986), I argue that bullshit inquiries challenge zetetic normativity to articulate why inquiry is vulnerable to abuse, and to enforce a corresponding norm constraining inquiry's process (cf.Siegel forthcoming; Friedman 2020). Bullshit inquiry exploits a central zetetic tension: inquiry is incredibly permissive, yet practical limitations justify pursuing only some available routes. To disallow abuse, I draw on Anderson (1995) to argue that the inquiry-guiding question must be more finely individuated to account for the interests driving inquiry.

Taylor Matthews
Reliabilism and Incompetence
Southampton · T.Matthews@soton.ac.uk
In this paper, I develop and defend a performance-theoretic conception of epistemic incompetence. I start by motivating the absence of such a conception within the virtue-epistemological literature, and in particular the work of Ernest Sosa. On my view, epistemic incompetence involves a deficiency of epistemic skill – or a deficiency of truth-conduciveness – and beliefs that result from such incompetence are maladroit and unjustified. After explicating my account, I demonstrate its superiority over two rival conceptions that I derive from the work of Heather Battaly and John Greco. I conclude by drawing out some implications that my account has for virtue epistemology.

Tetsuo KISHI
Are Scientific Theories Justified?
The University of Osaka · u726292g@ecs.osaka-u.ac.jp
In this presentation, I will discuss the relationship between the justification of scientific theories, namely scientific confirmation, and the anti-luminosity argument. Although the anti-luminosity argument has primarily been discussed within epistemology, it also carries implications for scientific practice. In the context of theory choice in physics, the

problem of underdetermination by evidence remains a persistent challenge. Bayesian approaches to this issue, however, confront the problem of the priors. By examining recent discussions of the anti-luminosity argument, this presentation aims to clarify its implications for the assigning prior probabilities to scientific theories.

Thibault Rushbrooke
Is Logic Distinctively Normative?
University of Oxford · thibault.rushbrooke@magd.ox.ac.uk
Most putative norms linking logic with reasoning are either too permissive, or too demanding. Steinberger's (2019) solution is to distinguish different normative roles: directives, evaluations, and appraisals. For evaluative norms, he suggests, it's appropriate to make excessive demands. For the other roles, permissiveness is appropriate.

I'll argue that Steinberger's specific proposal fails, because it doesn't distinguish logic from mere truth-preservation. However, Steinberger's distinction between normative roles is still important. I conclude that to make progress, we need to consider whether there are directive or appraisal norms which demand a high degree of logical acumen.

Tim Smartt
Ethics and Epistemology: Two Different Animals
University of Notre Dame Australia, Sydney · timjsmartt@gmail.com
(Co-authored with Nomy Arpaly). A popular strategy in recent epistemology is to take a notion originally at home in moral philosophy and to transpose it into an epistemological key. What justifies this strategy? A standard justification emphasizes the similarities between epistemology and ethics. In this paper, we emphazise the differences. We argue that one cluster of notions in ethics—those having to do with the will—have no corollaries in epistemology. The lacuna is important; without the presupposition that ethics and epistemology are largely symmetrical, the strategy of transposing notions from one domain into the other begins to look dubious.

Timothy Williamson
Why Is Knowledge First?
University of Oxford · timothy.williamson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
The talk will discuss from an evolutionary perspective why a knowledge-first approach to epistemology and the determination of content is better motivated than a belief-first approach, and why mindreading starts more naturally from knowledge ascription than from belief ascription.

Tom Ralston
Arbitrary Reasoning as a Source of Generic Knowledge
UCL · tomgjralston@gmail.com
Most discussions about knowledge of generalisations focus on beliefs in quantified generalisations, such as 'All/most cats are furry'. There has been less focus on knowledge of generics (sentences like 'Cats are furry'). I explore the sources of generic knowledge, focusing on a neglected source: non-deductive reasoning about arbitrary members of a category. I show that this kind of reasoning can justify generic (but not universal) conclusions and that it cannot be reduced to inductive reasoning because it can generate conclusions about categories or properties about which the reasoner has no prior evidence.

Tyler Porter
CONCEPT COMMANDEERING
Humboldt University · tyler.porter@colorado.edu

Manipulative people can harm their victims' concepts, and this impacts the victims' doxastic dispositions and belief-forming practices. Recent work in cognitive science shows that concepts and doxastic attitudes play distinct functional roles. Doxastic attitudes are propositional and let us represent the world, whereas concepts are sub-propositional and important for categorization, recognition, concept combination, and building conceptual networks. Manipulative people use a deleterious form of conceptual engineering I call concept commandeering to guide people into building problematic conceptual networks that harm their abilities to build doxastic attitudes and use their epistemic agency.

Valentin Teillet
Deliberative Democracy and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
EHESS · valentin.teillet@ehess.fr
The deliberative model dominates political epistemology because it preserves political equality while treating reason-giving as constitutive of legitimate decision. Yet reason-giving renders deliberation democratic only when contributions are answerable to an epistemic standard; without one, deliberation tracks social power rather than reasons, collapsing into demagogy or majoritarian tyranny. I argue that this standard is the Knowledge Norm of Assertion: assert p only if you know p. A truth norm still admits the demagogue who happens to speak truly, and a justified-belief norm the propagandist whose justifications are institutionally manufactured. Only knowledge excludes both.

Wenli Yao
*Is Generative Artificial Intelligence an Instrument or an Expert?*Sun Yat-sen University · yaowli@mail.sysu.edu.cn
This paper examines whether outputs of GAI should be understood as instrument readouts or expert testimony. The instrumental model preserves responsibility attribution but cannot explain how epistemic agents achieve subjective justification under conditions of deep opacity. The testimonial model captures GAI's assertoric surface but fails to ground normative accountability. I defend a third position: GAI outputs constitute conditional expert testimony, acquiring defeasible prima facie justificatory status only under expert normative guidance and absent clear conflict with established expert knowledge. Epistemic responsibility is distributed across a layered human–AI collaborative structure.

Will Gopal
Defending Human Anti-Reductionism and
University of Glasgow · w.gopal.1@research.gla.ac.uk
Beyond human testimony, local reductionism can explain when one is justified in believing the outputs of LLMs (Fricker, 2025). Absent an anti-reductionist position about the outputs of LLMs (AR-AI), reductionism enjoys greater explanatory power. The anti-reductionists' task, then, is to vindicate AR-AI. I argue that vindicating AR-AI requires solving a version of the source problem (Simion & Kelp, 2020): the AI-SP. However, this forces a dilemma for the anti-reductionist: develop novel solutions to AI-SP; or embrace reductionism about LLMs. The upshot is that embracing the latter horn need not come at the cost of inconsistency or abandoning one's broader anti-reductionist commitments.

Yotam Harel
The Value of Understanding: Should Mental States Count?
University of Oxford · yotam.harel@merton.ox.ac.uk
According to factive accounts of understanding, x understands p only if p is true. The experientialist justification, entailing that understanding is valuable because it induces positive mental states, has been used to justify the value of factive understanding. However, phenomenologically indistinguishable positive mental states can also be induced by non-factively understanding a false p. Hence, this justification for the value of factive understanding equally applies to non-factive understanding. This is a problem for advocates of factive understanding employing this justification, because they maintain that non-factive understanding is too superficial to amount to understanding.

Yousuf Hasan
Epistemic Agency in Democratic Education
Aga Khan University (Pakistan) · hasan.yousuf@aku.edu
Epistemic Agency in Democratic Education
When does participation in democratic education help students become responsible knowers in shared inquiry? We develop a socially situated virtue account of epistemic agency by bringing Pritchard's account of intellectual virtue into conversation with Fricker's work on epistemic injustice. Our contribution is to identify the conditions that make such participation epistemically responsible. Students must be heard fairly and held answerable for their judgments. This helps explain how students can disagree responsibly without treating some voices as less credible. It also shows why shared concepts matter when experience is difficult to express.

Zofia Zacharova
An instrumentalist account of the aim of inquiry
University of St Andrews and University of Stirling · zz77@st-andrews.ac.uk
The debate on the aim of inquiry centers on the question of which particular epistemic mental state ought to conclude inquiry. To answer this question, I suggest that we must determine why one ought to inquire in the first place. Assuming that one only ought to engage in inquiry as a means to some final end that one ought to pursue, such as action, assertion or practical reasoning, I will argue that one ought to conclude inquiry once one attains the epistemic mental state which is required for said final end.